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ENDOGENOUS WORST-CASE BELIEFS IN FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS
VITALI GRETSCHKO AND HELENE MASS
ZEW MANNHEIM AND UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE
Abstract. Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about
their competitors’ willingness to pay. We analyze bidding behavior in a first-price auction in
which the knowledge of the bidders about the distribution of their competitors’ valuations is
restricted to the support and the mean. To model this situation, we assume that under such
uncertainty a bidder will expect to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her expected
utility, given her bid is an optimal reaction to the bids of her competitors induced by this distri-
bution. This introduces a novel way to endogenize beliefs in games of incomplete information.
We find that for a bidder with a given valuation her worst-case belief just puts sufficient proba-
bility weight on lower valuations of her competitors to induce a high bid. At the same time the
worst-case belief puts as much as possible probability weight on the same valuation in order to
minimize the bidder’s winning probability. This implies that even though the worst-case beliefs
are type dependent in a non-monotonic way, an efficient equilibrium of the first-price auction
exists.
JEL classification: D44, D81, D82
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1. Introduction
Consider a company preparing a bid for a first-price procurement auction. The company’s
optimal bidding strategy will crucially depend on their belief about the costs of its competitors.
Typically, this company would spend a considerable amount of resources to reverse-engineer the
products of their competitors and learn about their cost structure. However, such learning has
its limits. For example, reverse-engineering may inform the company about the used components
and the general complexities in producing this part. But it cannot inform about the production
processes and the used equipment of its competitors. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
learning about the distribution of the competitors’ costs is not perfect and just specifies some
summary statistic of the underlying distribution like the support and the mean. How to weigh
the probabilities of certain costs within this support is subjective and hard to objectify. Thus,
in order to submit a bid in the auction, the company has to form a subjective belief.
In this paper we consider the problem of a bidder in a first-price auction whose only informa-
tion about the valuations of her competitors is the support and the mean of their distribution.
Given such a large uncertainty, it seems natural for this bidder to prepare for the worst case.1
Thus, we assume that for a given bidding strategy of her competitors the bidder will tailor her
1From our own experience in consulting bidders in high-stakes (procurement) auctions, it is a typical approach
taken by bidders to generate several scenarios with respect to the valuations (costs) of their competitors and
than to tailor their strategy to the worst-case.
1
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bid to be optimal given that she expects to face the worst distribution of of her competitors’
valuations among all distributions with the same support and mean. Worst distribution, in this
context, means the bidder will expect to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her
expected utility, given her bid is an optimal reaction to the bids of her competitors induced
by this distribution. In other words, the worst-case belief of a bidder minimizes her maximum
possible expected utility. We assume that every bidder in the auction follows a similar logic
when preparing her bid. In this case, a profile of bids is an equilibrium if each bidder chooses
her optimal bid given her valuation (type), the bidding strategy of her competitors, and the
worst-case belief as defined above. In particular, this implies that the worst-case belief of a
bidder will crucially depend on her type (valuation) in a non-monotonic way.
Our contribution is threefold. Our first contribution is to introduce a novel way to model
endogenous beliefs in a first-price auction. Endogenous, in this case, means that a bidder’s
beliefs about the valuations of the competitors are not assumed as a primitive of the environment
but arise naturally as worst-case beliefs from the game induced by the rules of the first-price
auction.2 This can be viewed as a relaxation of the paradigm of symmetric independent private
value (IPV) auctions that each bidder’s valuation for the object is drawn from a distribution
that is common knowledge among all bidders. Moreover, our solution concept constitutes a novel
way to analyze games with asymmetric information and can be straightforwardly extended to
any kind of such game.
Our second contribution is to show that even though the endogenous beliefs that arise from
our solution concept are type dependent in a non-monotonic way, an ex-post efficient equilibrium
exists. That is, even though the worst-case beliefs of bidders with a higher valuation do not
imply that they believe to face a stronger competition in the auction than bidders with a lower
valuation, in equilibrium the object is allocated with probability one to the bidder with the
highest valuation.
Our third contribution is to introduce a novel proof method that we use in order to derive
the worst-case strategies and beliefs in the efficient equilibrium. The method encompasses an
elegant way to compare the solutions of an infinite set of minimization problems. To fix ideas
and to gain some intuition for our results, consider the case that the valuation of a bidder can
take one of three valuations 0, θ and 1. Suppose furthermore that it is common knowledge
among the bidders that the mean of the distribution of valuations is µ with µ < θ. In this case,
the efficient equilibrium takes the following form: all bidders with valuation 0 bid 0, all bidders
with valuation θ mix between 0 and some bθ, and all bidders with a valuation of 1 mix between
bθ and some b1. The beliefs of a bidder with valuation 0 are arbitrary as she will always bid
0 and expect a utility of 0. A bidder with valuation θ believes that she is facing only bidders
2A different auction format would generate different worst-case beliefs.
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with valuations 0 and θ with probabilities such that the mean of her belief is µ. A bidder with
valuation 1 believes that she is facing bidders with valuations 0, θ, and 1 with probabilities




and bidding 0 and such that the mean
of her belief is µ. Given their beliefs, all bidders best reply to the bidding strategies of their
competitors. Given the bidding strategies, the beliefs make each bidder worst off given her type.
It may appear counterintuitive that, given her bid, the worst-case scenario for a bidder with
valuation θ is that she is the strongest bidder. However, given the bidding strategies in the
efficient equilibrium, the utility of a bidder with a valuation of θ depends only on the probability
that she is facing bidders with a valuation of 0. Given that the mean of the belief is fixed, this
probability is minimized if the probability of facing bidders with a valuation of 1 is zero. In
other words, for a bidder with a valuation of θ it is the worst-case that the probability that she
will face only bidders with a valuation of 0, against whom she will win for sure, is minimized.
For bidders with a valuation of 1, the worst-case is determined by minimizing her winning
probability while keeping the incentives intact to bid above bθ. Thus, the belief of a bidder with
a valuation of 1 puts just enough probability weight on 0 and θ such that she will bid above the
highest bid of a bidder with a valuation of θ and then as much probability as possible on 1.
The intuitions from the case with three types carry over to the general model. In particular,
the worst-case belief of a bidder with a given valuation just puts enough probability weight on
lower valuations to induce that for this bidder it is optimal to outbid each bidder with a lower
valuation. The remaining probability weight is put on the valuation of the bidder in question in
order to minimize her winning probability. It follows directly that such beliefs induce bidding
that leads to an efficient allocation.
In order to show that the proposed strategies indeed constitute an equilibrium with worst-
case beliefs, it remains to show that there is no other belief that would induce a bid that would
make a bidder worse off than in the proposed equilibrium. For this we introduce a novel proof
method. The underlying idea of the proof is to show that we can switch from comparing different
beliefs and their induced utilities to comparing different bids and their induced utilities. This
is due to the fact that a given best reply b can be induced by a multitude of beliefs (given the
bidder’s valuation and the other bidders’ strategies). It follows that every bid b can be identified
by a minimization problem: among all distribution functions with mean µ which induce bid
b as a best reply it suffices to consider the belief which leads to the minimum utility. Using
this concept, we can map every bid to a belief and a corresponding utility. Therefore, checking
whether the utility induced by b is lower than the utility induced by some other b′ establishes a
transitive total order on the set of bids.
We use three different tools with which we can compare different bids with respect to the
introduced transitive order. The first tool is to show that for certain types there exists only
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one distribution which induces a particular bid. This allows to directly compute the minimum
expected utility which can be induced by this bid for these types. The second tool constitutes
a connection between binding constraints in the minimization problem corresponding to a bid b
and bids which are lower than b with respect to our order. Third, we show that for a given type
there exist bids which can never be a best reply independent of the subjective belief. Hence,
these bids cannot be possible deviations from the proposed worst-case equilibrium for the given
type. Using these three tools, we construct a chain where all bids are arranged with respect to
our order and the efficient equilibrium bids are the lowest. Due to the transitivity of our relation,
this excludes all other bids as possible deviations from the proposed equilibrium strategy.
Besides specifying an efficient worst-case belief equilibrium, we provide a comparison of ex-
pected revenues of a second-price auction and a first-price auction under endogenous worst-case
beliefs for the case where bidders can have three discrete valuations 0, θ and 1. We show that for
certain parameter constellations of θ and µ the first-price or the second-price auction perform
better in terms of expected revenue independent of the true valuation distribution. There also
exist parameters θ and µ such that the revenue-maximizing choice of the auction format depends
on the true valuation distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We conclude the introduction with an
overview over the related literature. The second section contains the formal model including the
formal description of our solution concept, the worst-case belief equilibrium. In the third section
we show the existence of an efficient worst-case belief-equilibrium and derive the corresponding
beliefs and strategies for the special case of two bidders and three types. We consider this
special case in order to focus on the intuition of the results and to illustrate the techniques of
our proof. In the fourth section we conduct the revenue comparison between the first-price and
the second-price auction under endogenous worst-case beliefs for the case of two bidders and
three valuations. The fifth section contains the formal model and an outline of the proof for
the general case with an arbitrary number of bidders and discrete valuations. We conclude in
section six and section seven provides an overview over the most used notation and definitions.
The appendix contains the proofs not provided in previous sections. We provide all proofs in
the Appendix for the case of two bidders and three valuations and the general case separately.
The proofs for the special case are provided in order to give an intuition for the general case.
However, the model for the general case in the fifth section as well as the proofs for the general
case can be also understood without reading the special case first.
Relation to the literature. Our paper complements two strands of literature: the literature
on robust auction design and the literature on first-price auctions with non-standard priors.
Both strands of literature relax the typically strict assumptions that are placed on the beliefs of
the designer and the participants of an auction.
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Contrary to the literature on robust auction design that focuses on the problem of the designer
who does not have precise beliefs about the bidders, we focus on the problem of the bidder who
does not have precise beliefs about her competitors. Departing from the ideas posed in this
literature, we propose that not only the designer may be uninformed about the environment
but also the bidders, if they do not interact frequently, may have some uncertainty. We then
use modeling techniques developed in this literature and develop a novel solution concept to
analyze this problem. For example, ? consider optimal monopoly pricing under uncertainty
about demand distribution with a seller who either maximizes worst-case expected utilities
or minimizes the maximal regret. They find that the optimal pricing policy hedges against
uncertainty by randomizing over a range of prices. Buyers with low valuations cannot generate
substantial regret and are priced out of the market. ? consider a robust version of the classic
problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. The seller faces model
uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given
model distribution. They find that the equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then
in the absence of uncertainty. The concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger
information rent to all buyers with valuations below the optimal price without uncertainty.
? analyze the optimal selling mechanism if the seller maximizes worst-case expected profits
and is only informed about one moment of the distribution of the buyer’s valuations. They
show that the optimal mechanism entails distortions at the intensive margin, e.g., except for
the highest valuation buyer, sales will take place with probability strictly smaller than one.
The seller can implement such allocation by committing to post prices drawn from a non-
degenerate distribution, so that randomizing over prices is an optimal robust selling mechanism.
? considers the mechanism design problem of a seller who is uninformed about demand, while
potential buyers are well-informed. The seller’s goal is to maximize the minimum ratio between
expected revenue and the expected efficient utility. He characterizes simple mechanisms that
maximize the minimum extraction ratio. In these mechanisms, the seller runs a second-price
auction and simultaneously surveys the beliefs of buyers about other’s valuations. ? considers
a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain what the agent can and cannot do:
She knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The
principal demands robustness, evaluating possible contracts by their worst-case performance,
over unknown actions the agent might potentially take. He finds that the optimal contract from
the point of view of the principal is linear.
The literature on first-price auctions with non-standard priors relaxes the assumptions placed
on the priors of the bidders by the standard IPV model. For example, ? consider parametric
examples of symmetric two-bidder private valuation auctions in which each bidder observes her
own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent’s private valuation. They show
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that in such environments the revenue equivalence between the first and second-price auction
(SPA) breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking; while the SPA always allocates
efficiently, the first price auction (FPA) may be inefficient; equilibria may fail to exist for the
FPA. ? study auctions in which bidders may know the types of some rival bidders but not others.
They show that the first-price auction results in an inefficient allocation and that this inefficient
allocation translates into a poor revenue performance. ? characterize the set of all possible
outcomes that may arise in a first-price auction under any given information structure among the
bidders. They find that revenue is maximized when buyers know who has the highest valuation,
but the highest valuation buyer has partial information about others’ valuations. Revenue
is minimized when buyers are uncertain about whether they will win or lose and incentive
constraints are binding for all upward bid deviations. Contrary to this literature, we do not
assume an exogenously given prior but rather introduce a novel way to model endogenous beliefs
that will depend on the specific game structure. We find, in contrast to most findings in this
literature, that the first-price auction allocates efficiently.
2. Model
2.1. Setup. There are n risk-neutral bidders competing in a first-price sealed-bid auction for
one indivisible object. Before the auction starts, each bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n} privately observes
her valuation (type) θi ∈ Θ =
{
0 = θ1, θ2, . . . , θm−1, 1 = θm
}
. The valuation distributions are
unknown to the bidders. However, it is common knowledge among the bidders that the mean
of this distribution is µ. Hence, every bidder knows that the probability mass function of the
other bidders’ valuations is an element from
Fn−1µ =








= µ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ,
where for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, fi(θj) denotes the probability with
which valuation θj occurs according to the probability mass function fi. In other words, this is
the set of all probability mass functions of independently drawn valuations from the set Θ for
n − 1 bidders with mean µ. For a shorter notation we will use the term probability function
instead of probability mass function.
In the auction the bidders submit bids, the bidder with the highest bid wins the object and
pays her bid. In addition, we assume an efficient tie-breaking rule3. Thus, the utility of bidder
i with valuation θi and bid bi given that the other bids are b−i is denoted by 4
3We assume an efficient tie-breaking rule since it simplifies notation. With a random tie-breaking rule one would
need to assume a discrete bid grid (which may be arbitrarily fine) in order to ensure equilibrium existence.
However, the equilibrium strategies under both tie breaking rules would differ by at most one bid step in the bid
grid.
4For a vector (v1, . . . , vn) we denote by v−i the vector (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn).
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ui (θi, bi, b−i) =

θi − bi if bi > max
j 6=i
bj
θi − bi if bi = max
j 6=i
bj and θi > max
j 6=i
{θj | bj = bi}
0 if bi = max
j 6=i
bj and θi < max
j 6=i
{θj | bj = bi}
1
k (θi − bi) if bi = maxj 6=i bj and θi = maxj 6=i {θj | bj = bi}
0 if bi < max
j 6=i
bj
where θj denotes the valuation of bidder j with bid bj for j ∈ {1, ..., n} and k = #{max{θj |bj =
bi}}.
A (mixed) strategy βi of a bidder i maps the valuation (type) of a bidder to a distribution of
bids:
βi : Θ→ ∆R+
θi 7→ βi (θi)
where ∆R+ is the set of all probability distributions on R+. For bidder i with valuation θi it is




support supp (βi(θi)). A pure strategy of bidder i with valuation θi is a mapping
βi : Θ→ R+
θi 7→ βi (θi) ,
i.e. this is a mapping from the set of valuations to the set of bids.5 The expected utility of
a bidder i with valuation θi, belief f−i ∈ Fn−1µ and bid bi given that her competitors employ
bidding strategies β−i can be written as












2.2. Solution Concept. We are interested in the bidding behavior of a bidder who apart
from the support and mean has no information about the distribution of the valuations of her
competitors. Thus, in order to derive a bid, the bidder has to form a subjective belief. We
assume that this bidder will prepare for the worst case. Prepare means that the bidder will
choose her optimal bid given she expects to face the worst-case distribution of valuations. That
is, the bidder will expect to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her expected utility,
given her bid is an optimal reaction to the bids of her competitors induced by this distribution
5A pure strategy can be interpreted as distribution of bids which puts probability weight 1 on one bid. We abuse
notation since in the case of a pure strategy, βi (θi) denotes an element in R+ while in the case of a (mixed)
strategy βi (θi) denotes an element in ∆R+. However, in the following it will be clear whether βi is a pure or a
mixed strategy. In addition, we will also use the notation Gβiθi instead of βi(θi) in case of mixed strategies.
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and their bidding strategy. We will introduce the concept in several steps. First, we define the
best reply of bidder i to a given belief f−i and a given bidding strategy of the competitors β−i.
Second, we introduce the worst-case belief for a given bidding strategy of the competitors β−i.
That is, we derive the belief that minimizes the expected utility of bidder i given her best reply
to this belief and the bidding strategy of her competitors. Third, we will define the worst-case
belief equilibrium in which each type of each bidder bids the optimal bid given her worst-case
belief and the bidding strategy of her competitors.
Best reply to a belief and the competitors’ strategies. For bidder i with valuation θi and
for each belief f−i about the other bidders’ valuations and bidding strategies β−i, the set of best
replies of bidder i is given by
Bri (θi, f−i, β−i) = arg max
bi
Ui (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) .
Bidder i’s best reply induces an expected utility of
U (θi, f−i, bri (θi, f−i, β−i) , β−i)
for bri (θi, f−i, β−i) ∈ Bri (θi, f−i, β−i) .
Worst-case belief given a best reply and the competitors’ strategies. As argued before,
we will assume that a bidder prepares for the worst case, i.e. she will assume that the distribution
of her competitors’ valuations induces the worst utility given her best reply and the bidding
strategy of her competitors. Since after forming a belief, a bidder will choose an optimal bid
given this belief, a distribution induces the worst outcome for a bidder if it minimizes the
expected utility of a bidder given her optimal bid. That is, the worst-case belief minimizes
the maximum expected utility of the bidder. Formally, a worst-case belief fθi−i of bidder i with
valuation θi is given by
fθi−i = arg min
f−i∈Fn−1µ





Ui (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) .
Given the other bidders’ strategies β−i, a bidder i with type θi calculates her best reply
to each belief in Fn−1µ and the corresponding utility. The worst-case belief of bidder i is the
one inducing the lowest utility. In other words, the worst-case belief minimizes the maximum
possible expected utility of a bidder given her valuation and the other bidders’ strategies. Note
that a worst-case belief is not necessarily unique but every worst-case belief yields the same
utility.
Worst-case belief equilibrium. In equilibrium, after forming a worst-case belief as described
above, each bidder will choose an optimal bid given her valuation, her worst-case belief and
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the other bidders’ strategies. That is, in equilibrium it has to hold for every valuation of every
bidder that
(i) Given her valuation, her belief, and the other bidders’ strategies the bid of a bidder
maximizes her expected utility.
(ii) For every bidder there does not exists another belief such that a best reply to this belief
induces a lower expected utility.
This leads to the following definition.
Definition 1 (Worst-case belief equilibrium). A profile of bidding strategies (β1, . . . , βn) to-




−1, . . . , f
θm−1
−1 , f
θm−1 ], . . . , [fθ
1






∈ (Fn−1µ )m form
a worst-case belief equilibrium if for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, all θi ∈ Θ, all f−i ∈ Fn−1µ and all
bi ∈ supp (βi(θi)) it holds that













≤ Ui (θi, f−i, br (θi, f−i, β−i) , β−i) .
In the following we will refer to the first condition as the best-reply condition and to the second
condition as the worst-case belief condition.
3. Worst-case belief equilibrium: two bidders, three valuations
This section focuses on our main result which states that an efficient worst-case belief equilib-
rium exists. We characterize the beliefs and strategies in the worst-case belief equilibrium and
illustrate the techniques of our proof. We start our analysis with the case of two bidders, A and
B and and three possible valuations 0, θ and 1. This allows us to focus on the main features of
the concept without complex notation. The general case with n bidders and m types is analyzed
in section ??.
3.1. Efficient worst-case belief equilibrium.
Theorem 1. In a first-price auction there exists an efficient worst-case belief equilibrium.
In order to prove the existence of an efficient worst-case equilibrium, we specify a profile of
increasing strategies and beliefs and show that they constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium.
The underlying idea of the proof is to show that we can switch from comparing different beliefs
and their induced utilities to comparing different bids and their induced utilities. This is due to
the fact that a given best reply b can be induced by a multitude of beliefs (given the bidder’s
valuation and the other bidders’ strategies). It follows that every bid b can be identified by
ENDOGENOUS WORST-CASE BELIEFS IN FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 10
a minimization problem: among all distribution functions with mean µ which induce bid b as
a best reply it suffices to consider the belief which leads to the minimum utility. Using this
concept, we can map every bid to a belief and a corresponding utility. Therefore, checking
whether the utility induced by b is lower than the utility induced by some other b′ establishes a
transitive total order on the set of bids.
We use three different tools with which we can compare different bids with respect to the
introduced transitive order. The first tool is to show that for certain types there exists only
one distribution which induces a particular bid. This allows to directly compute the minimum
expected utility which can be induced by this bid for these types. The second tool constitutes
a connection between binding constraints in the minimization problem corresponding to a bid
b and bids which are lower than b with respect to our order. Third, we show that for a given
type there exist bids which can never be a best reply independent of the belief. Hence, these
bids cannot be possible deviations from the proposed worst-case equilibrium for the given type.
Using these three tools, we construct a chain where all bids are arranged with respect to our
order and the efficient equilibrium bids are the lowest. Due to the transitivity of our relation,
this excludes all other bids as possible deviations from the proposed worst-case strategy.
We start with the formal description of the strategies and beliefs we claim to constitute a
worst-case belief equilibrium. We will consider two possible cases: θ ≤ µ and θ > µ.
3.2. Characterization of the efficient worst-case belief equilibrium for θ ≤ µ. We start
with the simpler case θ ≤ µ and claim that the following strategies and beliefs constitute a worst-
case belief equilibrium. The proof of this claim is provided in section ??. Since both bidders
will have symmetric beliefs and strategies, we omit the identity of the bidder in the notation of
beliefs and strategies.
We denote the strategy which we claim to be played in a worst-case belief equilibrium by β∗.
We define
(3) β∗ (0) = 0, β∗ (θ) = θ, β∗ (1) = G∗1.
That is, a bidder with valuation zero bids zero, a bidder with valuation θ bids θ and a bidder
with valuation 1 plays a mixed strategy on the interval [θ, b1] according to a continuous bid
distribution G∗1. We will calculate G∗1 and the exact valuation of b1 further below. One can
immediately see that these strategies constitute an efficient equilibrium, that is, the bidder with
the highest valuation wins the auction with probability 1.
We will denote the belief which we claim to constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium together
with the strategies specified above, by f θˆ,∗ =
(






for θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}.6 That is, f θˆ,∗0
6In the following we will refer to β∗ and f θˆ
∗
as the worst-case strategy and the worst-case beliefs.
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denotes the probability with which bidder A with valuation θˆ believes that bidderB has valuation
zero (and analogously for other valuations and bidder B).
The subjective worst-case beliefs are defined as follows. Type zero can have any belief from
the setFn−1µ . A bidder with valuation θ has the subjective worst-case belief that the probability
weight in the other bidder’s probability function is solely distributed between valuations θ and








fθ,∗0 0 + f
θ,∗
θ θ + f
θ,∗
1 1 = µ.
In the following we will refer to these two constraints as the first and second probability constraint.
If it holds that fθ,∗0 = 0, it follows from these constraints that









We define the subjective worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1 to be the solution of the




s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ
(f0 + fθ) (1− θ) ≥ f0.7
The second and third constraints are the above described probability constraints. The last
constraint ensures that bidding θ is weakly better for a bidder with valuation 1 than bidding
any lower bid given the other bidder’s strategy.8 That is, there is just enough probability weight
on lower types in order to induce a bid of at least θ for type 1. It is sufficient to consider only a
possible deviation to bid 0 because all bids in the interval (0, θ) are placed with zero probability
and therefore are never best replies. Note that the feasible set of this minimization problem is
not empty since the worst-case belief of type θ is an element of the feasible set.
7We use the expression “the solution” instead of “a solution” since we will show that this minimization problem
has a unique solution. Also in the remainder of the paper we will use the term “the solution” in order to indicate
that we will show that the particular minimization problem has a unique solution.
8In the following we will use the notation with subscript "<" like inM1<θ in order to indicate that a minimization
problem does not contain all possible constraints but only the constraints which ensure that bidding a given bid
is weakly better than bidding any lower bid.
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In the case with three types such that θ ≤ µ the solution of minimization problem M1<θ can




s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ.
The solution of this minimization problem puts zero probability weight on type θ. Such a
solution does not fulfill the constraint
(f0 + fθ) (1− θ) ≥ f0.
Since this is the only constraint besides the probability constraints, this constraint has to be
binding in minimization problem M1<θ. Therefore, the solution of minimization problem M
1
<θ is











Given the subjective worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1, one can compute the upper
endpoint of her bidding interval, denoted by b1, and the bid distribution, denoted by G1.9 The





(1− θ) = 1− b1.












The bid distribution is defined such that bidders A and B with valuation 1 make each other
















3.3. Proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition for θ ≤ µ. After spec-
ifying the worst-case beliefs and strategy, we have to show that these indeed constitute a worst-
case belief equilibrium. That is, we have to show that the best-reply and the worst-case belief
condition are fulfilled.
9Since according to the worst-case strategy the support of the bid distribution for every type is an interval
(which may consists only of one point), we use the term "bidding interval" for the support of the bid distribution
prescribed by the worst-case strategy for a given type.
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Proposition 1. Given the worst-case strategy as defined in (??) and the worst-case beliefs as
defined in (??) and (??), it holds for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1} that
(i) The best-reply condition given by
bθˆ ∈ Br
(
θˆ, f θˆ,∗, β∗
)






is fulfilled, i.e. every bidder plays a best reply given her valuation, her worst-case belief
and the other bidder’s worst-case strategy.




















for all f ∈ Fµ.10
That is, there does not exist another belief such that a best reply to this belief induces a
lower expected utility than the worst-case belief.
Proof. Part (i): Due to the symmetry of beliefs and strategies, it is sufficient to show the best-
reply condition for bidder A. The result is obvious for a bidder with valuation zero. Given
the subjective worst-case belief of bidder A with valuation θ as defined in (??) and bidder
B’s strategy, bidder A with valuation θ considers θ to be the lowest bid placed by bidder B.
Therefore, she expects a utility of zero and bidding θ is a best reply. It follows from the definition
of the worst-case belief of bidder A with valuation 1 as defined in (??) that she does not earn
a higher expected utility by bidding any bid lower than θ. Bids in the interval (0, θ) are never
played according to β∗ and therefore cannot be a best reply. The constraint
(f0 + fθ) (1− θ) ≥ f0
in minimization problemM1<θ ensures that bidding zero does not induce a higher expected utility
than bidding θ. Since bidder B does not place bids above b1, it cannot be a best reply for bidder
A to bid above b1. The bid distribution G1 is constructed in a way which makes bidder A with
valuation 1 indifferent between any bid in [θ, b1] which completes the proof of part (i). 
The remainder of this section is dedicated to proving the worst-case belief condition. That
is, for every type we have to consider all probability functions over the valuations 0, θ and 1
with mean µ and have to show that none of these probability functions induces a lower expected
utility than the worst-case beliefs of the given type. Before we can complete the proof of part
(ii), we need to introduce several proof techniques.
As a first step, we will introduce the concept of minimizing probability functions which enables
us to switch from comparing the induced utility of probability functions to comparing the induced
10Since utility functions are symmetric among bidders, we will omit the identitiy of the bidder in the notation
of utility functions.
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utility of bids. Afterwards, we will introduce different tools with which we can compare the utility
induced by different bids and therefore exclude bids as possible deviations from the proposed
worst-case strategy.
Minimizing probability functions. Consider the list of possible subjective beliefs from which
bidder A chooses. Given the type of bidder A and bidder B’s strategy, every probability function
induces a best reply for bidder A. The best reply induces an expected utility:

























Here θA ∈ {0, θ, 1} denotes a valuation of bidder A and faB, f bB, . . . denotes a list of probability
functions of bidder B’s valuations among which bidder A chooses her subjective worst-case belief.
Note that different probability functions can induce the same best reply. Therefore, the list can
be rearranged by grouping those probability functions together which induce the same best reply:





























































Among the probability functions which induce the same bid, it is sufficient to consider the
probability functions which induce the minimum expected utility. That is, it is sufficient to
select the probability functions inducing the minimum expected utility from each group and
compare the induced utilities. Hence, we can switch from comparing probability functions to
comparing bids. This is formalized in the following definition and observation which we provide
for bidder A to simplify notation.
Definition 2. For bidder A with valuation θA ∈ {0, θ, 1}, a bid bA and the competitor’s strategy
βB, the set of probability functions Fmin (θA, bA, βB) given by
Fmin (θA, bA, βB) = arg min
fB∈Fµ
{U (θA, fB, bA, βB) | bA ∈ Br (θA, fB, βB)}
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is called the set of minimizing probability functions of bid bA for a bidder with valuation θA
given the other bidder’s strategy βB. Among all probability functions which induce bid bA as a
best reply, a minimizing probability function is a probability function which induces the minimum
utility.









of beliefs bidder A has about bidder B’s valuation. For a valuation θA ∈ {0, θ, 1} of bidder A





B , bA, βB
)
≤ U (θA, fB, br (θA, fB, βB) , βB)
for all fB ∈ Fµ, is equivalent to the following two conditions:
(i) The belief fθAB is an element in F
min (θA, bA, βB), i.e. a minimizing probability function
of bid bA for a bidder with valuation θA given B’s strategy βB.
(ii) Let b′A be a bid and fB be an element in F
min (θA, b
′
A, βB), i.e. a minimizing probability





B , bA, βB
)
≤ U (θA, fB, b′A, βB) .
Clearly, a belief cannot be a worst-case belief of a given type if this belief induces a bid as a
best reply for this type but there exists another belief which induces the same bid but with a
lower expected utility. Therefore, a worst-case belief has to be a minimizing probability function
for all bids in the support of bidder A’s bidding strategy, as stated in the first condition of the
observation. Moreover, for every type and every bid in the support of the given type there cannot
exist another bid which induces a lower expected utility together with a minimizing probability
function for this type and this bid, as stated in the second condition. In other words, if we
group together all probability functions which induce the same bid and consider the minimizing
probability function in every group, we can compare the expected utility induced by bids instead
the expected utility induced by beliefs.
That is, it is sufficient to compare bids if we compare them with respect to the expected
utility they induce together with their minimizing probability function. In order to apply this
technique, we need the following definitions.
Definition 3. For a bidder with valuation 1 minimization problem M1b of a bid b ∈ [θ, b1] is the
minimization problem corresponding to its minimizing probability functions, i.e. all solutions of
minimization problem M1b are minimizing probability functions of b for a bidder with valuation
1 given the other bidder’s worst-case strategy β∗. Formally, minimization problem M1b is given




(f0 + fθ + f1G1 (b)) (1− b)
s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ
(f0 + fθ + f1G1 (b)) (1− b) ≥ (f0 + fθGθ (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [0, bθ]
(f0 + fθ + f1G1 (b)) (1− b) ≥ (f0 + fθ + f1G1 (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [bθ, b1].
In other words, among all probability functions which induce bid b for type 1 as a best reply,
the solutions of minimization problemM1b induce the minimum expected utility. Note that since
bids above b1 are never a best reply, it is not necessary to include constraints which ensure that
bidding b induces at least the same expected utility as bids above b1.
Definition 4. Apart from the constraints
fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ,
every constraint in minimization problem M1b compares the utility of bidding b to the utility of
bidding some other bid b′, which is formalized by
U (1, f, b, β∗) ≥ U (1, f, b′, β∗) .
We call such a constraint an incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′.
Definition 5. For a type θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1} and bids b, b′ we use the notation b ≤θˆ b′ if for the
θˆ-type bid b′ does not induce a strictly lower expected utility than bid b together with their





































































⇒ b =θˆ b′.
We also use the notation b <θˆ b′ if b′ does not have a minimizing probability function given
θˆ because it is never a best reply for a bidder with valuation θˆ, but b does have a minimizing
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probability function. We use the notation b =θˆ b′ if neither b, nor b′ have a minimizing probability
function.
Given the notation provided in this definition and Observation ??, we can state a condition
which is equivalent to the worst-case belief condition but is more tractable:







and the other bidder’s strategy β∗ given by
U
(











for all f ∈ Fµ
is equivalent to





(ii) bθˆ ≤θˆ b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, b1].
In order to apply this observation, we will make use of the fact that the relation ≤θˆ constitutes
a transitive order which allows us to build chains of the form
bθˆ ≤θˆ b1 · · · ≤θˆ bk
and exclude all bids b1, . . . , bk as bids which could induce a lower expected utility.
After reframing the worst-case belief condition, we prove two lemmas which correspond to
two different tools with which we can compare the utility induced by different bids and therefore
exclude bids as possible deviations from the proposed worst-case strategy.11 The first tool is to
show that for every bid in the interval (θ, b1) there exists only one probability function which
induces this bid as a best reply for the 1-type. As a consequence, one can directly compute
the minimum utility which can be induced for a bid in the interval [θ, b1] and show that the
minimum utility is equal for all bids in the interval [θ, b1]. This is formalized in the following
Lemma and Corollary.




for f1,b ∈ Fµ. Then








, the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1.
The intuition behind this is that the worst-case belief of a 1-type together with the strategy
of the other 1-type makes her indifferent between any bid in the interval [θ, b1]. Any change
of the worst-case belief makes either a deviation to θ or to b1 more profitable. Hence, a bid
b ∈ (θ, b1) cannot be induced by a belief different from the worst-case belief of the 1-type. The
formal proof is relegated to Appendix ??.
Corollary 1. For every b ∈ [θ, b1] it holds that θ =1 b.
11We will need a third tool in the case θ > µ.
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That is, every bid in the interval [θ, b1] induces the same expected utility together with a
minimizing probability function.
Proof. As defined in (??), the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1, denoted by f1,∗, is
the solution of minimization problem M1<θ. Since we have shown that the best-reply condition
is fulfilled for type 1, it holds that f1,∗ is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem
M1θ . Since the constraints of minimization problem M
1
<θ are a subset of the constraints of
minimization problem M1θ , it follows that f
1,∗ is a solution of M1θ . It follows from Lemma ??
and the definition of the worst-case belief of the 1-type that every bid in [θ, b1) together with its













(1− θ). Therefore, it holds for all b ∈ [θ, b1] that
θ =1 b.

The second tool constitutes a connection between binding incentive constraints in minimiza-
tion problemM1b and bids which are lower than b with respect to the introduced transitive order
≤1.
Lemma 2. Let b be a bid and f1,b a solution of minimization problem M1b . If there exists a
binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid bˆ, i.e.
U
(




1, f1,b, bˆ, β∗
)
,
then it holds that bˆ ≤1 b.
Proof. Let L1b and L
1
bˆ






















1, f1,bˆ, bˆ, β∗
)
the values of the objective functions of min-
imization problem M1b and M
1
bˆ
respectively. In minimization problem M1
bˆ
for every s ∈ [θ, b1]
the incentive constraint corresponding to bid s given by
U
(
1, f, bˆ, β∗
)
≥ U (1, f, s, β∗)
is fulfilled for f = f1,b because it holds that
U
(








1, f1,b, s, β∗
)
.
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The equality follows from the fact that the incentive constraint corresponding to bˆ is binding in
minimization problem M1b . The inequality
U
(




1, f1,b, s, β∗
)




fulfilled by f1,b, it holds that f1,b is an element of L1
bˆ
. This also shows that the feasible set of
minimization problem M1
bˆ
is not empty. Therefore, in M1
bˆ
the solution of minimization problem
M1
bˆ












1, f1,b, b, β∗
)
.
We conclude that bid b together with a minimizing probability function does not induce a
lower expected utility than bid bˆ together with a minimizing probability function and it therefore
holds that bˆ ≤1 b. 
After introducing two tools with which we can compare bids with respect to the introduced
transitive order, we can prove the second part of Proposition ??.
Proof. Since by bidding zero a bidder with valuation zero expects a utility of zero and this is
the lowest possible utility, the worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for type zero. The expected
utility of a bidder with valuation θ induced by her worst-case belief and the other bidder’s
strategy is zero and therefore, the worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for type θ. It is left
to show the worst-case belief condition for type 1. As stated in Observation ??, the worst-case
belief condition for type 1 is equivalent to
(i) f1,∗ ∈ Fmin (1, b, β∗)
(ii) b ≤1 b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, b1]
for all b ∈ [θ, b1]. Analogously as in the proof of Corollary ??, one can show that the worst-case
belief of type 1 is a solution of minimization problem M1b for all b ∈ [bθ, b1]. It follows from
Lemma ?? that condition (i) is fulfilled for all bids in [bθ, b1). By definition of the worst-case
belief of type 1, this belief induces b1 as best reply for a bidder with valuation 1. Since any
probability function which induces b1 as a best reply for the 1-type yields an expected utility
of 1 − b1, any probability function with this property is a minimizing probability function.
Therefore, condition (i) is also fulfilled for bid b1. Given the result in Corollary ??, condition
(ii) reduces to
(7) θ ≤1 b for all b ∈ [0, θ).
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The only candidate for a bid in the interval [0, θ) which could induce a lower expected utility than
bid θ is 0 since all other bids cannot be a best reply independently of the belief. A minimizing




s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = 1 = µ
f0 ≥ (f0 + fθ + f1G1 (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [θ, b1].
Note that it is not necessary to include incentive constraints with corresponding bid in the
interval (0, θ) since such a bid is never a best reply. If only the constraints
s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = 1 = µ
would be considered, it would hold for the solution of M10 that f1 = 0. But then the constraint
f0 ≥ (f0 + fθ) (1− θ)
would be violated. Therefore, one of the incentive constraints in M10 has to be binding. Let bˆ be
the bid such that the corresponding incentive constraint is binding. It follows from Lemma ??
that bˆ ≤1 0. Since bids in the interval (0, θ) are never a best reply, it must hold that bˆ ∈ [θ, b1].
Using the transitivity of the relation ≤1, we conclude that
0 ≤1 bˆ =1 θ.
Thus, we have shown (??) which completes the proof. 
After proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition, we conclude that the strate-
gies and beliefs specified in ?? indeed constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium. This completes
the example with two bidders and three types such that θ ≤ µ and now we turn to the case
where θ > µ. As before, we first specify the worst-case strategy and beliefs.
3.4. Characterization of the efficient worst-case belief equilibrium for θ > µ. Again,
we denote the worst-case strategy by β∗ and define
(8) β∗ (0) = 0, β∗ (θ) = Gθ, β∗ (1) = G1.
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That is, type zero bids zero, type θ plays a mixed strategy on the interval [0, bθ] and type 1
plays a mixed strategy on the interval [bθ, b1]. As before, one can immediately see that this
constitutes an efficient equilibrium. We denote the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation
θˆ by
(






for θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}. Type zero can have any belief. The worst-case belief of




s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ.
Recall that in the case θ ≤ µ, by definition, the worst-case belief of a bidder with a given
type contained all incentive constraints with corresponding bids which are lower than the lower
endpoint of the type’s bidding interval. This also holds for the case θ > µ. Since type θ
plays a mixed strategy on an interval beginning with zero, there are no incentive constraints
in this minimization problem. Any solution of minimization problem M θ0 has to fulfill the two
probability constraints:
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ.





+ f1 = 1
















, fθ,∗1 = 0.
The upper endpoint of the bidding interval of a bidder with valuation θ is obtained by the
equation








⇔ bθ = fθ,∗θ θ = µ.
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The bid distribution of bidders A and B with valuation θ makes them indifferent between any
bid in their bidding interval. That is, it for every s ∈ [0, bθ] it holds that






(θ − s) .
The subjective worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1 is the solution of the following






s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1




) ≥ (f0 + fθGθ (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [0, bθ].
As before, the minimization problem contains all incentive constraints with corresponding bids
which are lower than the lower endpoint of type 1’s bidding interval. This implies that there is
just enough probability weight on types zero and θ in order to incentivize the 1-type to play a
mixed strategy on an interval beginning with bθ. The upper endpoint of type 1’s bidding interval


















The bid distribution of bidders A and B with valuation 1 makes them indifferent between any


















Note that in contrast to previous minimization problems we cannot derive the solution of
minimization problem M1
<bθ
directly since we have to consider an uncountable number of in-
centive constraints . For now, we proceed with the given definition of the worst-case belief of a
bidder with valuation 1 and provide the explicit solution of the minimization problem later on.
However, it is easy to see that the feasible set of minimization problem M1
<bθ
is not empty since
the worst-case belief of type θ is an element of this set.
3.5. Proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition for θ > µ. After spec-
ifying the worst-case strategy and beliefs, we have to show that these indeed constitute a worst-
case belief equilibrium. That is, we have to show the optimality and the worst-case belief
condition.
ENDOGENOUS WORST-CASE BELIEFS IN FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 23
Proposition 2. Given the worst-case strategy as defined in (??) and the worst-case beliefs as
defined in (??) and (??), it holds for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1} that
(i) The best-reply condition given by
bθˆ ∈ Br
(
θˆ, f θˆ,∗, β∗
)






is fulfilled, i.e. every bidder plays a best reply given her valuation, her worst-case belief
and the other bidder’s worst-case strategy.




















for all f ∈ Fµ.
That is, there does not exist another belief such that a best reply to this belief induces a
lower expected utility than the worst-case belief.
Proof. Part (i): The result is obvious for a bidder with valuation zero. The worst-case belief
of bidder A with valuation θ is that bidder B has valuation 1 with probability zero. Hence,
bidder A expects bθ = µ to be the highest bid placed by bidder B. The bid distribution of type
θ makes bidder A with valuation θ indifferent between any bid in the interval [0, bθ]. Therefore,
she has no incentive to deviate. It follows from the definition of the worst-case belief of bidder
A with valuation 1 that she does not earn a higher expected utility by bidding any bid lower
than bθ. Since bidder B does not play a bid above b1, it cannot be a best reply for bidder A
to bid above b1. The bid distribution G1 is constructed in a way which makes bidder A with
valuation 1 indifferent between any bid in [bθ, b1] which completes the proof. 
The remainder of the section is dedicated to proving the worst-case belief condition. Since type
zero expects the lowest possible utility of zero by bidding zero, the worst-case belief condition is
fulfilled for type zero. We will prove the worst-case belief condition for types θ and 1 separately,
i.e. we divide part (ii) of Proposition ?? into two different parts
(ii.1) The worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for type θ, i.e. for all b ∈ [0, bθ] it holds that
U
(
θ, fθ,∗, b, β∗
)
≤ U (θ, f, br (θ, f, β∗) , β∗) for all f ∈ Fµ.
(ii.2) The worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for type 1, i.e. for all b ∈ [bθ, b1] it holds that
U
(
1, fθ,∗, b, β∗
)
≤ U (1, f, br (1, f, β∗) , β∗) for all f ∈ Fµ.
We begin with part (ii.1). Similarly, as in the case θ ≤ µ, we prove three lemmas which
correspond to three different tools with which we can compare the utility induced by different
bids.12
12In contrast to the case θ ≤ µ, in the case θ > µ we will make use of three tools.
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The first lemma provides a similar result as Lemma ?? and Corollary ??. That is, we show
that for every bid in the interval (0, bθ) there exists only one probability function which induces
this bid as a best reply for the θ-type. As a consequence, one can directly compute the minimum
utility which can be induced for a bid in the interval [0, bθ] and show that the minimum utility
is equal for all bids in the interval [0, bθ].




for fθ,b ∈ Fµ. Then








, the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation θ.
We omit the formal proof since it works similarly to the proof of Lemma ?? and is also covered
by the general case.
Corollary 2. For every b ∈ [0, bθ] it holds that 0 =θ b.
That is, every bid in the interval [0, bθ] induces the same expected utility together with a
minimizing probability function.
Proof. Analogously as in the proof of Corollary ??, one can conclude that every bid in [0, bθ)
together with its unique minimizing probability function induces the same expected utility given
by fθ,∗0 θ.
It is left to show that 0 =θ bθ. Any probability function (f0, fθ, f1) which induces bid bθ = µ
as a best reply for type θ has to fulfill
(13) (f0 + fθ) (θ − µ) ≥ f0θ.
Since due to the probability constraints the smallest possible value for f0 is given by θ−µθ , it
must hold that
(f0 + fθ) (θ − µ) ≥ θ − µ
from which follows that f0 + fθ = 1. Hence, f0 and fθ are uniquely determined by the two
probability constraints. Any probability function which fulfills the probability constraints and
inequality (??) coincides with the worst-case belief of type θ.
Therefore, the worst-case belief of type θ is the only probability function which induces bθ = µ
as a best reply for type θ. Hence, the worst-case belief is the unique minimizing probability
function for bid bθ and it follows from the definition of the worst-case belief that bids 0 and bθ





(θ − µ) = fθ,∗0 θ.
Therefore, it holds for all b ∈ [0, bθ] that
0 =1 b.
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
The second lemma corresponds to Lemma ??. That is, it establishes a connection between
binding incentive constraints in minimization problem M θb and bids which are lower than b with
respect to the order ≤θ
Lemma 4. Let b be a bid and fθ,b a solution of minimization problem M θb . If there exists a
binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid bˆ, i.e.
U
(




θ, fθ,b, bˆ, β∗
)
,
then it holds that bˆ ≤θ b.
The same proof as for Lemma ?? applies. For the third tool, we show that for a given type
there exist bids which can never be a best reply independent of the subjective belief. Hence,
these bids cannot be possible deviations from the proposed worst-case equilibrium for the given
type.
Lemma 5. The feasible set of minimization problem M θb for all b ∈ (bθ, b1] is empty.
Assume there exists a bid b in the interval (bθ, b1] such that the feasible set of minimiza-
tion problem M θb is not empty. Then in a solution of minimization problem M
θ







, there must be strictly positive probability weight on the 1-type because other-
wise there would be no incentive to bid higher than bθ. In contrast, the worst-case equilibrium
belief of the θ-type has no probability weight on the 1-type. Hence, in order to preserve the
mean, the probability weight on the zero-type or the θ-type in the solution of minimization
problem M θb must be higher than in the worst-case belief. Given the worst-case belief, the θ-
type is indifferent among all bids in the interval [0, bθ]. If the probability weight of the zero-type
is increased, it is optimal for the θ-type to bid zero. Therefore, the probability weight on the
0-type cannot be increased. Similarly, if the probability weight on the θ-type is increased, it is









bid above bθ for the θ-type. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix ??.
After introducing the three tools, we can start with the proof of part (ii.1).
Proof. As stated in Observation ??, the worst-case belief condition for type θ is equivalent to
(i) fθ,∗ ∈ Fmin (θ, b, β∗)
(ii) b ≤θ b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, b1]
for all b ∈ [0, bθ].13 Analogously as in the proof of Corollary ??, one can show that the worst-
case belief of type θ is a solution of minimization problem M θb for all b ∈ [0, bθ]. It follows from
13We use the notation provided in Definitions ??-?? also for the case θ > µ but use β∗ as defined in ??.
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Lemma ?? that condition (i) is fulfilled for all bids in [0, bθ). As shown in the proof of Corollary
??, the worst-case belief of the θ-type is the only probability function which induces bθ as a
best reply. Therefore, condition (i) is fulfilled. Given the result in Corollary ??, condition (ii)
reduces to
0 ≤θ b for all b ∈ (bθ, b1].
It follows from Lemma ?? that for all b ∈ (bθ, b1] it holds that 0 <θ b which completes the proof
of part (ii.1). 
It is left to show part (ii.2) of Proposition ??, i.e. the worst-case belief condition for type 1.
Again, we prove three lemmas which correspond to the three tools presented above.
The first lemma provides a similar result as Lemma ?? and Corollary ?? (and as Lemma ??
and Corollary ?? in the case θ ≤ µ).




for f1,b ∈ Fµ. Then








, the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1.
Corollary 3. For every b ∈ [bθ, b1] it holds that bθ =1 b.
We omit the proofs of the Lemma and the Claim since they work with the same arguments
as before and are covered by the proof of the general case. The following lemma provides the
second tool and corresponds to Lemma ?? and Lemma ??.
Lemma 7. Let b be a bid and f1,b a solution of minimization problem M1b . If there exists a
binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid bˆ, i.e.
U
(




1, f1,b, bˆ, β∗
)
,
then it holds that bˆ ≤1 b.
The same proof as for Lemma ?? applies. The third tool in the proof of the worst-case belief
condition for the 1-type is similar to the third tool (Lemma ??) in the proof of the worst-case
belief condition for type θ. That is, we show that for a given type there exist bids which can
never be a best reply independent of the subjective belief. Hence, these bids cannot be possible
deviations from the proposed worst-case equilibrium for the given type.





Assume there exists a bid b ∈ (0, bθ) such that the minimization problem M1b has a solution








. Consider two bids b′, b′′ with 0 ≤ b′′ < b < b′ ≤ bθ.
bb′′ b′ bθ θ b10 1









, the utility for the 1-type of bidding b must be at least as high
as the utilities of bidding b′′ or b′. The higher f1,b0 , the lower is the optimal bid for type 1.
Therefore, the incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′′ sets a lower bound on the value of
f1,b0 while the incentive constraint corresponding to bid b
′ sets an upper bound. We will show
that the conditions resulting from these two bounds contradict each other. Intuitively, a bidder
bidding in the interval [0, bθ] faces the bid distribution Gθ of the θ-type which is constructed in
order to make the other θ-type indifferent. Thus, only for the θ-type the upper and the lower
bound are compatible. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix ?? .
Given the three tools, we can show part (ii.2).
Proof. As stated in Observation ??, the worst-case belief condition for type 1 is equivalent to
(i) f1,∗ ∈ Fmin (1, b, β∗)
(ii) b ≤1 b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, b1]
for all b ∈ [θ, b1]. Condition (i) can be proven analogously as in the proof of Proposition ?? and
due to Corollary ??, the second condition reduces to
bθ ≤1 b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, bθ).
It follows from Lemma ?? that for all b ∈ (0, bθ) it holds that bθ <1 b. Therefore, in order to
show the worst-case belief condition for type 1, it is left to show that
(14) bθ ≤θ 0.
As a next step, we use Lemma ??, in order to calculate the worst-case belief of a bidder with






s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1




) ≥ (f0 + fθGθ (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [0, bθ].
The solution of the reduced minimization problem which contains only the constraints
fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ
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would distribute the probability weight solely between type zero and one which would violate the
incentive constraint corresponding to bid zero. Hence, at least one of the incentive constraints
has to be binding. Let bˆ be a bid such that the corresponding incentive constraint is binding.
Since we have shown that the best-reply condition is fulfilled for type 1, it holds that f1,∗ is an
element of the feasible set of minimization problem M1
bθ
. Since the constraints of minimization
problem M1
<bθ
are a subset of the constraints of minimization problem M1
bθ
, it follows that f1,∗
is a solution of M1
bθ
. Therefore, it follows from Lemma ?? that bˆ ≤1 bθ. Due to Lemma ??, it




from which follows that bˆ = 0. Therefore, the worst-case

















The solution is given by
f1,∗0 =
(1− µ)2













s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = 1 = µ
f0 ≥ (f0 + fθGθ (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [0, bθ].
f0 ≥ (f0 + fθ + f1G1 (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [θ, b1].
The solution of the reduced minimization problem which contains only the constraints
s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = 1 = µ
would distribute the probability weight solely between types zero and θ which would violate the
incentive constraint corresponding to bid θ. Therefore, one of the incentive constraints with
corresponding bid different from zero has to be binding. Let bˆ′ be the bid corresponding to the
binding incentive constraint. It follows from Lemma ?? that bˆ′ ≤1 0.
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As argued above, the worst-case belief of type 1 is an element of the feasible set of minimiza-
tion problem M1
bθ
. Since the incentive constraint corresponding to bid zero is binding in this
minimization problem, it follows that the worst-case belief of type 1 is an element of the feasible
set of minimization problem M10 . This implies that the feasible set of minimization problem M10
is not empty. As stated in Lemma ??, the feasible set of minimization problem M1b is empty for
all b ∈ (0, bθ). Hence, it holds that 0 <1 b for all b ∈ (0, bθ). Therefore, it holds that bˆ′ ∈ [bθ, b1].
It follows from Corollary ?? that bθ =1 bˆ′. Thus, we can construct the transitive chain
bθ =
1 bˆ′ ≤1 0.
We have shown that (??) holds which we established as a sufficient condition for the worst-case
belief condition for type 1. 
Since we have shown that the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition hold for all types,
we conclude that the beliefs and strategies specified in ?? indeed constitute a worst-case belief
equilibrium.
4. Revenue comparison of the first-price and second-price auction
We want to compare the revenue of a first-price and a second-price auction in a setting where
bidders do not know the distribution of their competitors’ valuations. As described in the model,
we assume that the number of bidders, the set of possible valuations Θ and the exogenously
given mean µ of valuations is common knowledge. In a second-price auction bidding the own
valuation is a weakly dominant strategy and thus independent of the belief about the other
bidders’ valuations. Therefore, we assume that in a second-price auction bidders bid their
valuation. For the first-price auction we assume that bidders play the efficient worst-case belief
equilibrium.
Since the computation of revenue of the first-price auction involves the computation of the
worst-case beliefs and strategy which is computationally complex, we provide the formal revenue
comparison for the simplified case of two bidders with three possible types 0,θ and 1. As we will
see, it highly depends on the valuation distribution which auction leads to the higher revenue.
Hence, we cannot state any general theorems. The revenue comparison for a given valuation
distribution and a given number of bidders requires a computational solution.
4.1. Revenue of the second-price auction. In order to compute the revenue of the first-price
or the second-price auction, we need to know the true valuation distribution which we denote
by (f0, fθ, f1). Given that in a second-price auction all bidders bid their valuation, the revenue
of the second-price auction is obtained as follows. The expected revenue from type zero is zero.
The expected revenue from type θ is determined by the probability that the θ-type meets another
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θ-type against whom she wins with probability 12 and pays θ which gives an expected revenue
of 12fθθ. The expected revenue from a 1-type is determined by the probability that she meets a
θ-type, in this case the 1-type wins with probability 1 and pays θ, and by the probability that
she meets a 1-type, in this case the 1-type wins with probability 12 and pays 1. This results in
an expected revenue of fθθ + 12f1. The total expected revenue of a second-price auction from












Due to the probability constraints given by
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ,
there is only one degree of freedom in left in the choice of the probability function (f0, fθ, f1).
The probability constraints can be rewritten as
f0 = 1− fθ − f1
f1 = µ− fθθ
which gives
f0 = 1− (1− θ) fθ − µ
f1 = µ− fθθ.
Substituting the expression for f1 in (??) gives a revenue of
1
2











f2θ θ − f2θ θ2 + µ2
)
.
4.2. Revenue of the first-price auction. For the revenue calculation of the first-price auction
with worst-case beliefs we have to differentiate between the case µ ≥ θ and µ < θ. We start
with the case µ ≥ θ. In this case the θ-type bids θ. The winning probability of the θ-type is
f0 +
1
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⇔ b1 = 1− 1− µ



















(1− µ) (s− θ)





(1− µ) (1− s) (µ− θ2)+ (1− µ) (s− θ) (µ− θ2)
(1− s)2 (µ− θ2)2 =
(1− µ) (1− θ)
(1− s)2 (µ− θ2) .
The expected revenue from a 1-type is given by
ˆ b1
θ






1− µ+ θfθ + (µ− fθθ) (1− µ) (s− θ)
(1− s) (µ− θ2)
)
s
(1− µ) (1− θ)
(1− s)2 (µ− θ2)ds.











(f0 + fθ + f1G1 (s)) sdG1 (s) ds













1− µ+ θfθ + (µ− fθθ) (1− µ) (s− θ)
(1− s) (µ− θ2)
)
s
(1− µ) (1− θ)
(1− s)2 (µ− θ2)ds.









the worst-case equilibrium belief of type θ. As shown in section ??, the θ-type believes that







, f1,∗1 = 0.
The θ-type plays a mixed strategy on the interval [0, bθ] where bθ is defined by
θ − bθ = fθ,∗0 θ
⇔ bθ = θ − θ − µ
θ
θ = µ.








⇔ Gθ (s) = sf
θ,∗
0
fθ,∗θ (θ − s)
=
s (θ − µ)





(θ − µ)µ (θ − s) + s (θ − µ)µ
µ2 (θ − s)2 =
(θ − µ) θ
µ (θ − s)2 .
The expected revenue from a bidder with valuation θ is given by
ˆ µ
0





1− µ− (1− θ) fθ + fθ s (θ − µ)
µ (θ − s)
)
s
(θ − µ) θ
µ (θ − s)2ds.








, is the unique solution of the following
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(1− µ) (s− µ)
µ (1− θ) (1− s)




(1− µ) (1− b)µ (1− θ) + (1− µ) (b− µ)µ (1− θ)
µ2 (1− θ)2 (1− s)2 =
(1− µ)2
µ (1− θ) (1− s)2 .










1− µ+ θfθ + (µ− fθθ) (1− µ) (s− µ)




µ (1− θ) (1− s)2ds.













1− µ− (1− θ) fθ + fθ s (θ − µ)
µ (θ − s)
)
s
(θ − µ) θ






1− µ+ θfθ + (µ− fθθ) (1− µ) (s− µ)




µ (1− θ) (1− s)2ds.
4.3. Revenue comparison. After calculating the expected revenue of the first-price and the
second-price auction we can compare the revenue for a given θ and µ in dependence of the
valuation of fθ. The minimum possible valuation for fθ is zero. In case θ ≤ µ the maximum
possible valuation of fθ is obtained if f0 = 0 and is equal to 1−µ1−θ . In case θ > µ, the maximum
possible valuation of fθ is obtained if f1 = 0 and is equal to µθ .
The following graph illustrates the revenue comparison for the first-price auction (blue line)
and the second-price auction (red line) for the parameters θ = 0.4 and µ = 0.5.
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Figure 1. Revenue of the first-price auction (blue line) and second-price auction
(red line) plotted against fθ for θ = 0.4 and µ = 0.5
In this case the auctioneer would choose the first-price auction independent of the true valua-
tion distributions. However, there exist valuations for θ and µ where the revenue functions cross,
i.e. it depends on the true valuation distribution which auction leads to the higher revenue.
The following graph illustrates the revenue comparison for the first-price auction (blue line)
and the second-price auction (red line) for the parameters θ = 0.6 and µ = 0.5.
Figure 2. Revenue of the first-price auction (blue line) and second-price auction
(red line) plotted against fθ for θ = 0.6 and µ = 0.5
We conclude that the revenue comparison highly depends on the parameters θ and µ and
depending on the valuation of θ and µ, it can depend on the true valuation distribution.
5. General Case: n bidders with m valuations
In this section we provide all definitions and results required for the general case with n
bidders and m types. As before, the main result is that there exists an efficient worst-case belief
equilibrium.
Theorem 2. In a first-price auction there exists an efficient worst-case belief equilibrium.
5.1. Characterization of the efficient worst-case belief equilibrium. As in the case of two
bidders and three types we begin with the characterization of the strategies and beliefs which we
claim to constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium.14 We denote the worst-case strategy by β∗.
14As before, we call the strategy and beliefs we claim to constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium worst-case
strategy and worst-case beliefs.
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The support of the bid distribution of a bidder with valuation θk is denoted by [bθk−1 , bθk ]. As
every bidder adopts the same worst-case belief-equilibrium, we omit the identity of the bidder in
the notation. Every bidder has the same worst-case belief and moreover, in the worst-case belief
of a bidder every other bidder has the same valuation distribution. Thus, we can denote the













be the probability with which one of the other n−1 bidders has the θl-type in the belief
of a bidder with valuation θk.





= θk. Let θz be the lowest type which is strictly greater than µ. The belief of a bidder
with valuation θk ≤ µ is the probability function which puts strictly positive weight only on fθk
θk

























θz − θk .
Given this belief, it is a best reply for a bidder with valuation θk to bid θk since the lowest
bid which such a bidder believes is played by another bidder is given by θk. This induces the
lowest possible expected utility of zero and therefore, the strategies and beliefs specified for types
θk ≤ µ fulfill the best-reply condition and the worst-case belief condition.
Now we define the bidding strategy and beliefs for a bidder with valuation θk with θk > µ. A
bidder with type θk > µ plays a mixed strategy on the interval [bθk−1 , bθk ] where the upper limit
of type θk’s bidding interval is the lower limit of type θk+1’s bidding interval. We will derive
the boundaries of this bidding interval inductively starting with the boundaries of the bidding
interval of the θz-type, which we defined above as the lowest type strictly greater than µ. The
θz-type plays a mixed strategy on the interval [bθz−1 , bθz ] with bθz−1 = θz−1. We define the
worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation θz to be the solution of the following minimization
problem which we denote by M θz<θz−1 :
min
(fθ1 ,...,fθm )
(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθz−1)n−1
(
θz − θz−1)









(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθz−1)n−1
(
θz − θz−1) ≥ (fθ1)n−1 θz
(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθj−1)n−1
(
θz − θz−1) ≥ (fθ1 + fθ2)n−1 (θz − θ2)
...
(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθz−1)n−1
(
θz − θz−1) ≥ (fθ1 + · · ·+ fθz−2)n−1 (θz − θz−2) ,
i.e. among all distributions with mean µ such that for a bidder with valuation θz it is weakly
better to bid θz−1 than any lower bid given the other bidders’ strategies, it is the distribution
inducing the minimum utility. We do not have to include the incentive constraints with corre-
sponding bid b for b ∈ (θh−1, θh) for 1 < h < z − 1 since these bids are never played according
to the worst-case strategy and thus are never a best reply. Note that the feasible set of this
minimization problem is non-empty since a distribution which puts strictly positive probability
weight only on the θz−1- and the θz-type preserving the mean µ is an element of the feasible




+ · · ·+ fθz ,∗
θz−1
)n−1 (
θz − θz−1) = (θz − bθz).
The bid distribution Gθz is defined such that every bidder with valuation θz is indifferent between
every bid in her bidding interval given her belief and the other bidders’ strategies, i.e. for every














+ · · ·+ fθz ,∗
θz−1
)n−1 (
θz − θz−1) .
After we have specified the strategies and beliefs for the θz-type, we can proceed inductively.
Assume, that strategies and beliefs have been specified for types 1, . . . , k−1 with z ≤ k−1 < m,
then strategies and beliefs for type k are defined as follows. A bidder with valuation θk plays a
mixed strategy on the interval [bθk−1 , bθk ] where bθk−1 is the upper bound of the bidding interval
of the θk−1-type. We define the worst-case belief of type θk to be the solution of the following




























n−1 (θk − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ],
i.e. among all distributions with mean µ such that for a bidder with valuation θk it is weakly
better to bid bθk−1 than any lower bid given the other bidders’ strategies, it is the distribution
inducing the minimum utility. The bid distribution Gθk and bθk are determined such that given
this belief every bidder with valuation θk is indifferent between all bids in [bθk−1 , bθk ]. Formally,















n−1 (θ − s) .
Obviously, the worst-case strategy is efficient. We will show in the next section that the feasible
set of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
is not empty. Moreover, in Lemma ?? in Appendix ??
we derive the unique solution of this minimization problem. We show that for the worst-case
belief of a bidder with valuation θk it holds that fθ
k,∗








is the unique solution of the system of k linear equations which includes the
two probability constraints and the binding incentive constraints with corresponding bid bθj for
1 ≤ j ≤ k − 2.
5.2. Proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition. After specifying the
worst-case strategy and beliefs, we have to show that they indeed constitute a worst-case belief
equilibrium. That is, we have to show the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition.
Proposition 3. Given the worst-case strategy and the worst-case beliefs as defined in ??, it
holds for all θˆ ∈ Θ that
(i) The best-reply condition given by
bθˆ ∈ Br
(
θˆ, f θˆ,∗, β∗
)






is fulfilled, i.e. every bidder plays a best reply given her valuation, her worst-case belief
and the other bidders’ worst-case strategy.
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for all f ∈ Fn−1µ .15
That is, there does not exist another belief such that a best reply to this belief induces a
lower expected utility than the worst-case belief.
Proof. Part (i): It follows directly from the definition of the worst-case beliefs, that for a bidder
with valuation θk it is weakly better to bid bθk−1 than any lower bid. By construction, a bidder
with valuation θk is indifferent between any bid in [bθk−1 , bθk ]. Hence, it is left to show that it is
weakly better to bid bθk−1 than any bid higher than bθk . In order to do so, we will compare the
solutions of the following two minimization problems. LetM θk
<bθk−1
be the minimization problem
which corresponds to the worst-case belief of the bidder as defined above:
min
(fθm ,...,fθm )



















fθj + fθhGθh (s)
n−1 (θk − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ],
i.e. among all distributions with mean µ such that for a bidder with valuation θk it is weakly
better to bid bθk−1 than any lower bid given the other bidders’ strategies, it is the distribution




the distribution inducing the minimum utility among all distributions with mean µ such that












15Since utility functions are symmetric among bidders, we will omit the identitiy of the bidder in utility function.
Moreover, if there exists an asymmetric belief about the other bidders’ valuations which violates the worst-
case belief condition then due to the symmetry of the worst-case strategy, there exists also a symmetric belief.
Therefore, it is sufficient to focus only on symmetric beliefs as possible deviations.














n−1 (θk − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ].






respectively. The constraints of M θk
<b
θk−1
are a subset of the constraints of M θk
<b
θk−1
. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that fθk,∗ is an




In fθk,∗ there is no probability weight on types above θk because this would require more
probability weight on types below µ and hence increase the value of the objective function. If we
plug in fθk,∗ into M θk
b
θk−1
, then all constraints which correspond to a bid above bθk are fulfilled
because there is no probability weight on types above θk. As argued above, all constraints with
corresponding bid in the interval [0, bθk ] are fulfilled. Therefore, fθ
k,∗ is an element of the feasible




Computing the worst-case belief of a bidder is equivalent to computing the distribution in-
ducing the minimum utility of a bidder given the other bidders’ strategies. Thus, one has to
solve the trade-off between putting probability weight on lower types in order to induce a high
bid and putting probability weight on higher types in order to reduce the winning probability.
This proof shows that this trade-off is solved such that the worst-case belief of a bidder with
valuation θk puts just enough probability weight on lower types in order to induce the bid bθk−1
and puts as much as possible probability weight on type θk in order to reduce the bidder’s
winning probability.
One can use this proof in order to show that the worst-case belief of the θk−1-type is an
element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
. Hence, one can show by induction














(θk−1 − bθk−2) = θk−1 − bθk−1 .
Therefore, for all s with s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ] with h ≤ k − 1 it holds that













n−1 (θk−1 − s) .
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It follows that for all s with s < bθk−1 the incentive constraint corresponding to s is fulfilled if
plugging in fθk−1,∗ into M θk
b
θk−1
because adding the inequalities







n−1 (θk−1 − s)
and







n−1 (θk − θk−1)
yields







n−1 (θk − s) .




We have already shown the worst-case belief condition for all types θk ≤ µ. In order to show
the worst-case belief condition for higher types, as in the case of three types and two bidders,
we introduce the concept of minimizing probability functions and show that we can switch from
comparing the induced utility of distributions to comparing the induced utility of bids. This is
formalized in the following definition and observation.
Definition 6. For a bidder with valuation θi, a bid bi and a strategy β−i of the other bidders,
the set of probability functions Fminn−1 (θi, bi, β−i) given by
Fminn−1 (θi, bi, β−i) = arg min
f−i∈Fn−1µ
{U (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) | bi ∈ Br (θi, f−i, β−i)}
is called the set of minimizing probability functions of bid bi for a bidder with valuation θi given
the other bidders’ strategies β−i. Among all probability functions which induce bid bi as a best
reply, a minimizing probability function is a probability function which induces the minimum
utility.








be a profile of
beliefs bidder i has about the other bidders’ valuations. For a valuation θi of bidder i and a bid












r (θi, f−i, βi) , β−i
)
for all f−i ∈ Fn−1µ , is equivalent to the following two conditions:
(i) The belief fθi−i is an element in F
min
n−1 (θi, bi, β−i), i.e. a minimizing probability function
of bid bi for bidder i with valuation θi given the other bidders’ strategies β−i.
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(ii) Let b′i be a bid and f−i be an element in F
min
n−1 (θi, b′i, β−i), i.e. a minimizing probability







≤ U (θi, f−i, b′i, β−i) .
That is, it is sufficient to compare bids if we compare them with respect to the expected utility
they induce together with a minimizing probability function. In order to apply this technique,
we need the following definitions.
Definition 7. For a bidder with valuation θ minimization problem M θb of a bid b ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ] is
the minimization problem corresponding to its minimizing probability functions, i.e. all solutions
of minimization problem M θb are minimizing probability function of b for a bidder with valuation







n−1 (θ − b)








(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl−1)n−1 (θ − b) ≥
 h∑
j=1
fθj + fθhGθh (s)
n−1 (θ − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ].
Definition 8. Apart from the constraints








every constraint in minimization problem M θb compares the utility of bidding b to the utility of
bidding some other bid b′, which is formalized by
U (θ, f, b, β∗) ≥ U (θ, f, b′, β∗) .
We call such a constraint an incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′.
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Definition 9. For a type θ and bids b, b′ we use the notation b ≤θ b′ if for the θ-type bid b′
does not induce a strictly lower expected utility than bid b together with their minimizing prob-
ability functions given the other bidders’ worst-case strategy β∗. Formally, let fmin (θ, b, β∗) ∈
Fminn−1 (θ, b, β∗) and fmin (θ, b′, β∗) ∈ Fminn−1 (θ, b′, β∗) . Then it holds that
U
(
θ, fmin (θ, b, β∗) , b, β∗
) ≤ U (θ, fmin (θ, b′, β∗) , b′, β∗) ⇒ b ≤θ b′,
U
(






















) ⇒ b =θ b′.
We also use the notation b <θ b′ if b′ does not have a minimizing probability function given
θ because it is never a best reply for a bidder with valuation θ, but b does have a minimizing
probability function. We use the notation b =θ b′ if neither b, nor b′ have a minimizing probability
function.
Given the notation provided in this Definition, we can state a condition which is equivalent
to the worst-case belief condition but is more tractable:







and bidder B’s strategy β∗ given by
U
(











for all f ∈ Fn−1µ
is equivalent to





(ii) bθˆ ≤θˆ b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, bθm ].
As in the case with two bidders and three valuations, we prove three lemmas which correspond
to three different tools with which we can compare the utility induced by different bids and
therefore exclude bids as possible deviations from the proposed worst-case strategy. The first
tool is to show that for every valuation θk ≥ θz for every bid in the interval (bθk−1 , bθk ] there
exists only one probability function which induces this bid as a best reply for the θk-type.16 As
a consequence, one can directly compute the minimum utility which can be induced for a bid
in the interval [bθk−1 , bθk ] and show that the minimum utility is equal for all bids in the interval
[bθk−1 , bθk ]. This is formalized in the following Lemma and Corollary.
16Recall that we defined θz to be the smallest valuation which is strictly greater than µ.
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equals to fθk,∗, the worst-case belief of a
bidder with valuation θ.
The intuition behind this result works similarly as for the result for two bidders and three
types in Lemma ??. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix ??.




That is, every bid in the interval [bθk−1 , bθk ] induces the same expected utility together with
a minimizing probability function.
Proof. We have shown in the first part of Proposition ?? that the best-reply condition is fulfilled
for all types. Hence, it holds that the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation θk ≥ θz, which
is the solution of minimization problemM θk
<b
θk−1




. Since the constraints of M θk
<b
θk−1
are a subset of M θk
b
θk−1
, it holds that fθ,∗ is
a solution of M θk
b
θk−1
. It follows from Lemma ?? and the definition of the worst-case belief of
a bidder with valuation θk that every bid in (bθk−1 , bθk ] together with its unique minimizing















The second tool constitutes a connection between binding incentive constraints in the mini-
mization problem corresponding to a bid b and bids which are lower than b with respect to our
order. It corresponds to Lemmas ??,?? and ?? in the case of two bidders and three types.
Lemma 10. Let θ be a valuation, b a bid and fθ,b a solution of minimization problem M θb . If
there exists a binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid bˆ, i.e.
U
(




θ, fθ,b, bˆ, β∗
)
,
then it holds that bˆ ≤θ b.
Proof. Let Lθb and L
θ
bˆ




, . . . , fθ,bθm
)
and fθ,bˆ =(










θ, fθ,bˆ, bˆ, β∗
)
the values of the objective
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functions of minimization problem M θb and M
θ
bˆ
respectively. In minimization problem M θ
bˆ
for
every bid s the incentive constraint corresponding to s given by
U
(
θ, f, bˆ, β∗
)
≥ U (θ, f, s, β∗)
is fulfilled for f = fθ,b because it holds that
U
(








θ, fθ,b, s, β∗
)
.
The equality follows from the fact that the incentive constraint corresponding to bˆ is binding in
minimization problem M θb . The inequality
U
(




θ, fθ,b, s, β∗
)
holds because fθb is a solution of minimization problem M
θ
b . Since every constraint in M
θ
bˆ
is fulfilled by fθ,b, it holds that fθ,b is an element of Lθ
bˆ
. Therefore in M θ
bˆ
, the solution of
minimization problemM θ
bˆ
has to induce a lower or equal utility than the solution of minimization
problem M θb and it follows that
U
(








θ, fθ,b, b, β∗
)
.
We conclude that bid b together with a minimizing probability function does not induce a
lower expected utility than bid bˆ together with a minimizing probability function and therefore
it holds that bˆ ≤θ b. 
For the third tool, we show that for a given type there exist bids which can never be a best
reply independent of the subjective belief. Hence, these bids cannot be possible deviations from
the proposed worst-case equilibrium for the given type.
Lemma 11. For every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−1 and every b with
bθl−1 < b < bθl the feasible set of minimization problem M θ
k
b is empty.
Lemma 12. For every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θk+1 ≤ θl and every b with
bθl−1 < b ≤ bθl the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb
θl
is empty.
The formal proof is relegated to Appendices ?? and ??. The intuition for Lemma ?? is similar
to Lemma ?? and the intuition for Lemma ?? is similar to Lemma ??, i.e. as in the case of two
bidders and three valuations. We provide a detailed intuition for both results at the end of this
section.
After introducing these three tools, we can provide the proof of part (ii) of Proposition ??.
That is, we prove that the worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for all types. In this proof
we construct a chain where all bids are arranged with respect to our order and the efficient
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equilibrium bid is the lowest. Due to the transitivity of our relation, this excludes all other
distributions than the efficient worst-case beliefs as a potential deviation.
Proof. Analogously as in the proof of Corollary ??, one can show that for all θk ≥ θz it holds






for all b ∈ [bθk−1 , bθk ] Thus, we can conclude from Observation ?? and Corollary ?? that in order
to show the worst-case belief condition, it is left to show that for all θk ≥ θz it holds that
(16) bθk−1 ≤θ
k
b for all b ∈ [0, bθm ]\[bθk−1 , bθk ].
Lemma ?? shows that if b ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ] was to induce a lower expected utility than bθk−1 and
l < k, then b needs to be either bθl−1 or bθl . Since every lower bound of a bidding interval is the
upper bound of some interval, it is w.l.o.g. to assume that b is equal to bθl for an appropriate
l. Lemma ?? shows that a lower expected utility can be achieved by inducing a bid only in the
bidding interval of a lower type. Lemma ?? and ?? combined state that if b ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ] was
to induce a lower expected utility than bθk−1 , then b = bθl for 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 2. In order to show
that all bids bθl with 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 2 do not induce a lower expected utility than bθk−1 , we need
to show the following two Lemmas.
Lemma 13. For every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−1 the unique solution














is obtained as follows. Choose
the minimum p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that the probability vector (fθ1 , . . . , fθm) is an element of the
feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
fθj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
where (fθ1 , . . . , fθp+2) is the unique solution of the system of linear equations with p+2 equations

















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p}


























n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}




= 0 for all m ≥ j > p∗ + 2 if p∗ < l. If p∗ ≥ l, then there are p + 1




= 0 for all p∗ + 1 < j ≤ m.








This is a linear system of two equations which gives a unique fθ1 and fθ2 . If with the proba-





, then we stop. Otherwise we add the equation which is identical to the binding incentive
constraint with corresponding bid 0, i.e.








and obtain a unique solution for (fθ1 , fθ2 , fθ3) and check whether the vector
(fθ1 , fθ2 , fθ3 , 0 . . . , 0) is an element of the feasible set and so forth until we find an element
of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
. Let bθp∗ be the bid corresponding to this








, . . . , f
θk,b
θl













is the unique solution of the system of
17If p ≥ l, then the number of equations equals to p+1 since the equation which is the binding incentive constraint
corresponding to bid bθl is redundant.
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equations given by the probability constraints and all added incentive constraints if p∗ < l − 1.
In case p∗ ≥ l − 1, the solution has p∗ + 1 variables which are greater than zero.
Lemma 14. For every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−2 the minimum p
for minimization problem M θk
b
θl
is greater or equal then l + 1.
Finally, Lemma ?? states that the construction in Lemma ?? leads to a minimum p which is
greater than l. This implies that the binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid l + 1,
i.e.












corresponding to bθl+1 is binding and it follows from Lemma ?? that bθl ≥θk bθl+1 . With the
same reasoning in minimization problem M θk
b
θl+1
the constraint corresponding to bθl+2 is binding





k · · · ≥θk bθk−1 .
We conclude that there does not exist a bid which induces a lower expected utility than bθk−1
which shows the statement in (??). This completes the proof of part (ii) of Proposition ?? which
states that the worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for all types. 
We relegate the formal proofs of Lemma ?? and ?? to Appendices ?? and ?? and provide an
intuition for Lemma ??-??.
Intuition for Lemma ??-??. The intuition for Lemma ?? works similarly as for Lemma ??:
Assume there exists a solution of minimization problem M θkb such that bθl−1 < b < bθl and θ
z ≤









. Consider two bids b′, b′′ ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ] with b′′ < b < b′.
The utility for the θk-type of bidding b must be at least as high as the utilities of bidding b′′ or
b′. The higher fθ
k,b
θl−1 , the lower is the optimal bid for type θ
k (if we allow only for bids in the
interval [bθl−1 , bθl ]). Therefore, the incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′ sets an upper
bound on the valuation of fθ
k,b
θl−1 while the incentive constraint corresponding to bid b
′′ sets a
lower bound. We will show that the conditions resulting from these two bounds contradict each
other. Intuitively, a bidder bidding in the interval [bθl−1 , bθl ] faces the bid distribution Gθl of
the θl-type which is constructed in order to make her indifferent between any bid in the interval
[bθl−1 , bθl ]. Thus, only for the θl-type the upper and the lower bound imposed by the incentive
constraints corresponding to bids b′′ and b′ are compatible.
In order to explain to intuition for Lemma ?? and Lemma ??, we illustrate how to construct
a solution of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
. Given some belief (fθ1 , . . . , fθm), the expected utility
ENDOGENOUS WORST-CASE BELIEFS IN FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 48
of bidder i with valuation θk and bid bθl is given by





Choosing a probability function which minimizes the expected utility is equivalent to choosing a
distribution which minimizes the sum fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl . If we would look for a probability function
which minimizes the sum fθ1 + · · · + fθl considering only the first probability constraint, we
would set fθ1 + · · · + fθl to zero and put all the probability weight on types above θl. If we
add the constraint that the probability function must have mean µ, this is not longer possible
because the mean would be too high. Therefore, one would select types on which to put a
strictly positive probability weight in a way such that the mean of the probabilities of types
equal or lower than θl is minimized. Then one would put as much as possible probability weight
on types above θl without violating the constraint that the mean has to be µ. In other words,
independently of the valuation of µ one would put strictly positive probability weight only on
types 0 and θl+1 because this choice minimizes the mean of the probabilities of types equal or
lower than θl. Then we would choose fθ1 and fθl+1 such that the mean is µ. If we add the
incentive constraints, one would shift only so much probability weight on types above 0 as it is
necessary to fulfill the incentive constraints. In particular, one would put probability weight on
some type θj only if the probability weight on lower types cannot be increased without violating
a constraint.
The statement in Lemma ?? reflects exactly this reasoning. Consider the system of equations
given by the probability constraints and the equations which are identical to the binding incentive
















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1}.
Assume that for the solution fθ1 , . . . , fθp+1 of this system of equations (or fθ1 , . . . , fθp if p−1 ≥ l)




. If we now add the equation with corresponding bid bθp , i.e.









then in the solution of the extended system of equations it holds that fp+2 > 0 (or fθp+1 > 0
if p ≥ l). We have to check whether the vector (fθ1 , . . . , fθp+2 , 0, . . . 0) is an element of the
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feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
. Since the new vector has positive probability weight
on fθp+2 , it must hold that there is less probability weight on types below fp+2 than in the old
vector (fθ1 , . . . , fθp+2 , 0, . . . 0) (and analogously for the case p ≥ l). Therefore, the construction
in Lemma ?? ensures that probability weight on a higher type is shifted only if a constraint
in minimization problem M θk
b
θl
is not fulfilled and shifting weight on lower types is not possible
because all constraints corresponding to lower types already hold with equality.
This reasoning also explains the intuition of Lemma ??. It states that for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and l > k the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb for b ∈ (bθl−1bθl ] is empty. The belief
of type θk is constructed such that there is just enough probability weight on types below θk in
order to induce a mixed strategy in the bidding interval of the θk-type. As argued above, the
choice of types on which there is strictly positive probability weight minimizes the mean of the
probabilities of types below θk. If one would try to induce a bid bθl above bθk , the probability
weight on the θl-type has to be increased. In order to preserve the mean, this would imply
a decrease of the probability weight on lower types. This is not possible without violating a
constraint since the belief of type θk had already the lowest possible mean of the probabilities
of types below θk.
In order to understand Lemma ??, consider minimization problem M θl
b
θl−1
for 1 ≤ l ≤ m. As
shown in the proof of part (i) of Proposition ??, the solution of this minimization problem is the









. Since in this proof we have also shown






, . . . , fθ
l,∗
θl
, 0, . . . 0
)
. In Appendix ?? we prove Lemma ?? which states that
the solution of minimization problem M θl
b
θl−1
is the solution of the system of l equations given
by the two probability constraints and the l − 2 incentive constraints given by the bids bθj for
1 ≤ j ≤ l − 2. Hence, for this minimization problem the minimum p equals to l − 2. Now
consider minimization problem M θk
b
θl−1









of the system of l equations given by the two probability constraints and the binding incentive

















? In minimization problem M θl
b
θl−1
a constraint with corresponding
bid bθj given by

















ENDOGENOUS WORST-CASE BELIEFS IN FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 50
In minimization problem M θk
b
θl−1
the same incentive constraint is equivalent to








This shows that in minimization problem M θk
b
θl−1
it is possible to put more probability weight


















. But then the constraint corresponding to bid bθl is not fulfilled under(
f˜θ
k




. Hence, one has to add an additional constraint. Since the constraint correspond-
ing to bid bθl−1 is redundant, one has to add the constraint corresponding to bid bθl . Thus, the
minimum p in minimization problem M θk
b
θl−1
is greater than l − 1.
After proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition, we conclude that the strate-
gies and belief specified in ?? indeed constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium.
6. Conclusion
We provide a novel approach to endogenize beliefs in games of incomplete information and
apply this approach to bidding in first-price auctions. Our model is based on the assumption
that bidders in a first-price auction who, apart from the mean of the distribution, have little
information about the valuations of their competitors prepare for the worst case. Preparing
for the worst-case means that the bidders assume that given the bidding strategies of their
competitors they will face ex-ante the worst distribution of valuations. Given that all bidders
prepare in the same way a worst-case belief equilibrium arises whenever all bidders best-reply
to the bidding strategies of their competitors and their corresponding worst-case beliefs. In
particular, this implies there is no other belief such that the best reply to this belief will yield
a higher pay-off than in equilibrium. The resulting beliefs are type-dependent and due to the
assumption of a constant mean of the distribution the beliefs cannot be strictly ordered by first-
order stochastic dominance. In particular this implies that bidders with higher valuations not
necessarily face higher competition. Nevertheless, we show that a worst-case equilibrium exists
that allocates the object to the bidder with the highest valuation with probability one.
Our concept of the worst-case belief equilibrium can be easily extended to any game of incom-
plete information and provides a very intuitive way to endogenize beliefs. This is in particular
helpful when modeling situations in which players only interact infrequently and thus may not
be able to form reasonable objective beliefs.
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7. Notation
• Ui (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) denotes the expected utility of a bidder i with valuation θi, belief
about the other bidders’ valuations f−i, bid bi given the other bidders’ strategies β−i.
• For bidder i with valuation θi and for each belief f−i about the other bidders’ valuations
and bidding strategies β−i, the set of best replies of bidder i is given by
Bri (θi, f−i, β−i) = arg max
bi
Ui (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) .








denotes the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation θk. The bid distribution of a
bidder with valuation θk which is prescribed by the worst-case strategy is denoted by




= Gθk . The support of this bid distribution is given by [bθk−1 , bθk ].
• The worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation θk is the solution of minimization prob-
lem M<b
θk−1






n−1 (θk − bθk−1)








(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl−1)n−1 (θk − bθk−1) ≥
h−1∑
j=1
fθj + fθhGθh (s)
n−1 (θk − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ].
That is, minimization problem M<b
θk−1
ensures that bidding bθk−1 induces at least the
expected utility than bidding any lower bid given the other bidders’ worst-case strategy
β∗.
• For a bidder with valuation θi, a bid bi and a strategy β−i of the other bidders, the set
of probability functions Fminn−1 (θi, bi, β−i) given by
Fminn−1 (θi, bi, β−i) = arg min
f−i∈Fn−1µ
{U (θi, f−i, bA, β−i) | bA ∈ Br (θi, f−i, β−i)}
ENDOGENOUS WORST-CASE BELIEFS IN FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 52
is called the set of minimizing probability functions of bid bi for a bidder with valuation
θi given the other bidders’ strategies β−i.
• For a bidder with valuation θ minimization problem M θb of a bid b ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ] is the
minimization problem corresponding to its minimizing probability function, i.e. all so-
lutions of minimization problem M θb are minimizing probability function of b for bidder
with valuation θ given the other bidders’ worst-case strategy β∗. Formally, minimization






n−1 (θ − b)








(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl−1)n−1 (θ − b) ≥
 h∑
j=1
fθj + fθhGθh (s)
n−1 (θ − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ],




, . . . , fθ,bθm
)
.
• Apart from the constraints








every constraint in minimization problem M θb compares the utility of bidding b to the
utility of bidding some other bid b′, which is formalized by
U (θ, f, b, β∗) ≥ U (θ, f, b′, β∗) .
We call such a constraint an incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′.
• For a type θ and bids b, b′ we use the notation b ≤θ b′ if for the θ-type bid b′ does
not induce a strictly lower expected utility than bid b together with their minimiz-
ing probability functions given the other bidders’ worst-case strategy β∗. Formally, let





θ, fmin (θ, b, β∗) , b, β∗
) ≤ U (θ, fmin (θ, b′, β∗) , b′, β∗) ⇒ b ≤θ b′,
U
(






















) ⇒ b =θ b′.
We also use the notation b <θ b′ if b′ does not have a minimizing probability function
given θ because it is never a best reply for a bidder with valuation θ, but b does have a
minimizing probability function. We use the notation b =θ b′ if neither b, nor b′ have a
minimizing probability function.
Appendices
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma ??












such that b is
a best reply to f1,b for a bidder with valuation 1 but f1,b differs from the worst-case belief of









f1,∗0 + δ0, f
1,∗





Since f1,b has to fulfill the two probability constraints, it must hold that
(17) δ0 + δθ + δ1 = 0
(18) δθθ + δ1 = 0.
Due to (??), (??) and f1,b 6= f1,∗, it must hold that either δ0 < 0 or δ0 > 0. First, we consider
the case δ0 < 0. Subtracting (??) from (??) gives
δ0 + δθ (1− θ) = 0
(19) ⇔ δθ = − δ0
1− θ
from which follows that δθ > 0. Due to (??), it follows that δ1 < 0. By definition of the bid































f1,∗0 + δ0 + f
1,∗
θ + δθ + (f
1,∗









from which follows that(
δ0 − δ0








⇔ −θδ0 (b− θ)− δ1(1− θ) (1− b) ≤ 0.
Since b > θ and δ0 and δ1 are smaller than zero, this leads to a contradiction.
Now we consider the case δ0 > 0. It follows from (??) that δθ < 0. Due to (??), it follows





































f1,∗0 + δ0 + f
1,∗









f1,∗0 + δ0 + f
1,∗






from which follows that(
δ0 − δ0












)− δ1(1− θ) (1− b1 −G1 (b) (1− b)) ≥ 0.
Since 1− b1 > 1− b > G1 (b) (1− b), b1 > b and δ0 and δ1 are greater than zero, this leads to a
contradiction. We conclude that if a bid b ∈ (θ, b1) is a best reply to a belief for a bidder with
valuation 1, then this belief coincides with the worst-case belief of the 1-type.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma ??
Proof. Assume that the feasible set of minimization problem M θb with b ∈ (bθ, b1] is not empty.


















fθ,∗0 + δ0, f
θ,∗






It holds that fθ,b1 > 0 because otherwise bidding above bθ is not a best reply. Since f
θ,∗
1 = 0, it
follows that δ1 > 0. Due to the probability constraints, it must hold
(20) δ0 + δθ + δ1 = 0
(21) δθθ + δ1 = 0.
Hence, it must hold that δθ < 0 because otherwise (??) cannot be fulfilled. Subtracting (??)
from (??) gives
δ0 + δθ − δθθ = 0.
Since δθ − δθθ < 0, it follows that δ0 > 0. Because the expected utility from bidding b must be














fθ,∗0 + δ0 + f
θ,∗

































where the last equality follows from the definition of bθ in (??). It follows that
(δ0 + δθ + δ1G1 (b)) (θ − b) > δ0θ > 0.
Because b ≤ θ, it must hold that
δ0 + δθ + δ1G1 (b) > 0.
Since δ1 > 0 and G1 (b) ≤ 1, it holds that
0 < δ0 + δθ + δ1G1 (b) ≤ δ0 + δθ + δ1G1 (b) + δ1 (1−G1 (b)) = δ0 + δθ + δ1 = 0.
We conclude that the assumption that the feasible set of minimization problem M θb with b ∈
(bθ, b1] is not empty, leads to a contradiction. 
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma ??
Proof. The formal proof works by contradiction. Assume that there exists a b ∈ (0, bθ) such that









































Let s′′ < b < s′ be such that
(24) s′ − b = b− s′′ = α
for some appropriate α > 0. Rearranging of (??) gives
(25) ⇔ f1,b0 ≥
f1,bθ Gθ (s
′) (1− s′)− f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b)
s′ − b .
Rearranging of (??) gives
(26) ⇔ f1,b0 ≤
f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b)− f1,bθ Gθ (s′′) (1− s′′)
b− s′′ .
If we show that
(27)
f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b)− f1,bθ Gθ (s′′) (1− s′′)
b− s′′ <
f1,bθ Gθ (s
′) (1− s′)− f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b)
s′ − b ,
we find a contradiction between inequalities (??) and (??). Due to (??), inequality (??) is
equivalent to




1− s′′) < f1,bθ Gθ (s′) (1− s′)− f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b) .
If b is a best reply to f1,b, it must hold that f1,bθ > 0 because otherwise bidding zero or above
bθ would be strictly better. Therefore, the inequality is equivalent to




1− s′′)+Gθ (s′) (1− s′) > 0.
Due to (??), this is equivalent to
−2Gθ (b)
(
1− s′ + α)+Gθ (s′′) (1− s′ + 2α)+Gθ (s′) (1− s′) > 0
(28) ⇔ (1− s′) [−2Gθ (b) +Gθ (s′′)+Gθ (s′)] + α[−2Gθ (b) + 2Gθ (s′′)] > 0.








⇔ Gθ (s) = f
θ,∗
0 s
fθ,∗θ (θ − s)
.
If b ≤ µ2 , we choose s′′ = 0 and it holds that s′ = 2b ≤ µ = bθ.
57
Then inequality (??) is equivalent to
(29)
(
1− s′)( −2fθ,∗0 b









fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
> 0.
It holds that
θ − b− (θ − 2b) > 0
⇔ −2b (θ − 2b) + 2b (θ − b) > 0.
Due to (??), this is equivalent to








fθ,∗θ (θ − s′)
> 0.
It follows that in order to show (??), it is sufficient to show that
(
θ − s′)( −2fθ,∗0 b









fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
≥ 0.
Multiplying the inequality with (θ − b) and plugging in α = (s′ − b) reduces the problem to
(30) −2b (θ − s′)+ s′ (θ − b)− 2b (s′ − b) ≥ 0.
It holds that
s′ ≥ 2b
⇔ −2b (θ − b) + s′ (θ − b) ≥ 0
⇔ −2bθ + s′θ − s′b+ 2b2 ≥ 0
−2bθ + 2bs′ + s′θ − s′b− 2bs′ + 2b2 ≥ 0
−2b (θ − s′)+ s′ (θ − b)− 2b (s′ − b) ≥ 0.
Thus, we have shown inequality (??) from which follows that inequality (??) holds. This shows
that inequalities (??) and (??) lead to a contradiction in case b ≤ µ2 .












⇔ Gθ (s) =
−fθ,∗0 (µ− s) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − s)
.
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If b > µ2 , then we set s




2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
+
−fθ,∗0 (µ− (2b− µ)) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)





2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
+
−2fθ,∗0 (µ− (2b− µ)) + 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)





2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
+
−2fθ,∗0 (µ− b) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)





2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
+
−4fθ,∗0 (µ− b) + 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − 2b+ µ)
)
> 0
⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α)− 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0
⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)[θ − θµ+ θα− 2b+ 2bµ− 2bα+ µ− µ+ µα− (θ − θµ+ 2θα− b+ bµ+ 2bα)]
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)[−αθ − b+ µb+ µ− µ+ µα]
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
By definition of α in (??), this is equivalent to
⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)[−(µ− b)θ − b+ µb+ µ− µ+ µ(µ− b)]
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
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⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)[µ− b− θ(µ− b)]
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) ≥ 0.
Since 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)[µ− b− θ(µ− b)] > 0, it is sufficient to show that
(31) − 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α)
+ fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α) + fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
It holds that
µ > b
⇔ (µ− b) (1− θ) (−θ + µ+ θ − 2b+ µ) > 0
⇔ − (θ − µ) (µ− b) (1− θ) + (θ − 2b+ µ) (µ− b) (1− θ) > 0
⇔ (θ − µ) [−θb+ b− µ+ µθ] + (θ − 2b+ µ) [θb+ µ− b− µθ] > 0
⇔ (θ − µ) [−θ + θb+ 2b− 2b2 − µ+ µb+ θ − 2bθ + θµ− b+ 2b2 − bµ]
+ (θ − 2b+ µ) [−θ + θb+ µ− µb+ θ − b− µθ + µb] > 0
⇔ (θ − µ) [− (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− b) + (θ − b) (1− 2b+ µ)]
+ (θ − 2b+ µ) [− (θ − µ) (1− b) + (1− µ) (θ − b)] > 0
Since fθ,∗θ > 0, this is equivalent to
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− b) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− 2b+ µ)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
Since −b = −µ+ α and −2b+ µ = −µ+ 2α, this is equivalent to
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
Thus, we have shown inequality (??) from which follows that inequality (??) holds. This
shows that inequalities (??) and (??) lead to a contradiction in case b > µ2 . We conclude that
in any possible case the assumption that the feasible set of minimization problem M1b with
b ∈ (0, bθ) is not empty, leads to a contradiction. 
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Appendix D. Proof of Lemma ??
Proof. We have to show that for every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−1
and every b with bθl−1 < b < bθl the feasible set of minimization problem M θ
k
b is empty. Assume
that there exist l and b with bθl−1 < b < bθl such that there exists an element of the feasible set








































































Let s′′ < b < s′ be such that
(34) n−1
√
θk − s′′ − n−1
√
θk − b = n−1
√
θk − b− n−1
√
θk − s′ = α
⇔ n−1
√
θk − s′ + α = n−1
√
θk − b , n−1
√
θk − s′ + 2α = n−1
√
θk − s′′







































































θk − b− n−1√θk − s′ .








































































θk − s′′ − n−1√θk − b .




























θk − b− n−1√θk − s′ ,










































θk − s′ > 0.
If bid b is a best reply, it must hold that fθ
k,b
θl



























θk − s′ > 0
⇔ n−1
√
θk − s′ (−2Gθl (b) +Gθl (s′′)+Gθl (s′))+ α (−2Gθl (b) + 2Gθl (s′′)) > 0
(38) ⇔ n−1
√
θk − s′ (−2Gθl (b) +Gθl (s′′)+Gθl (s′)) > α (2Gθl (b)− 2Gθl (s′′)) .





















































denotes the worst-case belief of the θl-type.
Let b∗ be defined by
n−1
√
θk − bθl−1 − n−1
√
θk − b∗ = n−1
√
θk − b∗ − n−1
√
θk − bθl .
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If b ≤ b∗, we choose s′′ = bθl−1 and it holds that
n−1√
θk − b− n−1
√
θk − s′ = n−1
√





θk − bθl−1 − n−1
√
θk − b∗ = n−1
√





θk − s′ ≥ n−1
√
θk − b− n−1
√
θk − b∗ + n−1
√
θk − bθl ≥ n−1
√
θk − bθl







θl − bθl−1 − n−1
√
θl − b and αs′2 := n−1
√
θl − b− n−1
√
θl − s′.











































θl − b .


































θl − b .
Since n−1√ is concave, it holds that αs′1 ≤ αs
′
2 from which follows that
−2αs′1
n−1√







θl − s′ > 0.
Hence, if θk > θl, it is sufficient to show that
−2αs′1 n−1
√









θl − b ≥ 2ααs′1 .
Since αs′1 ≤ αs
′
2 , it is sufficient to show that
−2αs′1 n−1
√
θl − s′ + 2αs′1 n−1
√
θl − b ≥ 2ααs′1
⇔ − n−1
√
θl − s′ + n−1
√
θl − b ≥ α
which is true since n−1√ is concave. Thus, we have shown inequality (??) and conclude that in
the case b ≤ b∗ the assumption that the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb is not empty,
leads to a contradiction.
63
If b > b∗, then we choose s′ = bθl and it holds that
n−1√
θk − s′′ − n−1
√
θk − b = n−1
√





θk − b∗ − n−1
√
θk − bθl = n−1
√





θk − s′′ ≤ n−1
√
θk − bθl−1 − n−1
√
θk − b∗ + n−1
√
θk − b ≤ n−1
√
θk − bθl−1






θl − b− n−1
√




θl − s′′ − n−1
√
θl − b.



















































































































































































θk − bθl + α
)
n−1√
θl − s′′ + fθl,∗
θl
n−1√
θl − s′′ n−1
√
































θk − bθl + 2α
)
n−1√
θl − b > 0.
Since n−1√ is concave, it holds that αs′′1 ≥ αs
′′






















































θl − s′′ n−1
√












θk − bθl + 2α
)
n−1√
θl − b > 0.
If θk > θl, it holds that α n−1
√




θk − bθl + α
)
and therefore it is
























































θl − s′′ n−1
√












θk − bθl + 2α
)
n−1√
θl − b ≥ 0.

















θl − s′′ n−1
√












θk − bθl + 2α
)
n−1√
θl − b ≥ 0.
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By definition of α in (??), it holds that n−1
√
θk − bθl + α = n−1
√




θl − bθl n−1
√
θk − b n−1
√
θl − s′′ + n−1
√
θl − s′′ n−1
√






θl − bθl n−1
√
θk − s′′ n−1
√






θl − b n−1
√
θk − bθl − n−1
√









θk − b n−1
√
θl − s′′ − n−1
√







θl − b n−1
√
θk − bθl − n−1
√
θl − bθl n−1
√
θk − b > 0,
n−1√
θk − b n−1
√
θl − s′′ − n−1
√
θk − s′′ n−1
√
θl − b > 0
and
n−1√
θl − s′′ ≥ n−1
√
θl − bθl ,




θl − b n−1
√
θk − bθl − n−1
√







θk − b n−1
√
θl − s′′ − n−1
√







θl − b n−1
√
θk − bθl − n−1
√







θk − b n−1
√
θl − s′′ − n−1
√






























θk − b− α+ n−1
√



























θl − b− α1 + n−1
√




















Thus, we have shown inequality (??) and conclude that also in the case b > b∗ the assumption
that the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb for θ
k > θl and bθl−1 < b < bθl is not empty,
leads to a contradiction.

For the proofs to follow we will need the following Lemma.
Appendix E. Lemma ??

















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}.
Proof. As defined in ??, the worst-case belief of type θk is the solution of the minimization
problem with objective function




which consists of the two probability constraints and all incentive constraints with corresponding




. The constraints of this


















for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ].




solution of minimization problem M θk
b
θk−1
. Hence, an incentive constraint corresponding to a bid
b with bθj−1 < b < bθj with 1 < j < k − 1 cannot be binding because otherwise it would follow
from Lemma ?? that the solution of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
would be an element of the
feasible set of minimization problem M θkb . But this would be a contradiction to Lemma ??.
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Hence, the set of possible binding incentive constraints is a subset of the incentive con-
straints with corresponding bids bθj with j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}. It is left to show that every
incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθj with j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2} is binding. As shown
in the proof of part (i) of Proposition ??, in the worst-case belief of type θk there is no prob-






, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θk
, 0, . . . , 0
)





, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θk
, 0, . . . , 0
)
an incentive con-




. Then we will construct a feasible solution of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1





, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θk













Given the intuition provided above for Lemma ??, this should not come as a surprise. We
stated that in the solution of a minimization problem M θk
b
θk−1
the probability weight on lower
types should be as high as possible without violating a constraint because this allows to put
probability weight on high types without violating the second probability constraint. More
precisely, if a constraint with corresponding bid bθj is not binding, this implies that one can
reduce the probability weight on fθj−1 and increase probability weight on fθj without violating
an incentive constraint. This reduces the mean and therefore one can increase the probability
weight on fθk . This results in a lower value of the objective function. The rest of the proof
formalizes this idea.









i.e. let θl be the smallest valuation such that fθ
k,∗
θl









+ θ1 , f
θk,∗
θ2
, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θl
− θl , fθ
k,∗
θl+1
, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θk
− θk , fθ
k,∗
θk+1




fulfills all constraints of M θk
<b
θk−1
but leads to a lower value of the objective function. Here
θ1 , θl , θk are strictly positive real numbers such that it holds
(40) θ1 − θl + θk = 0
(41) −θlθl + θkθk = 0.
First, we will show that such θ1 , θl , θk exist, then we will show that the proposed vector is an
element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
. Since it follows from (??) that
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θ1−θl < 0, it follows directly that the constructed vector leads to a lower value of the objective
function than fθk,∗.
Equations (??) and (??) are solved by any choice of θ1 , θl , θk that fulfill






















This shows that θ1 , θl , θk can be chosen as strictly positive real numbers. Moreover, it holds
that the smaller the valuation of θ1 , the smaller the valuation of θl . Therefore, θ1 , θl , θk can




+ θ1 + · · ·+ fθ
k,∗
θl














is fulfilled. The probability constraints are fulfilled by construction. Since all incentive con-




, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θk
, 0, . . . , 0
)




= 0 for all 1 < j < l, all incentive constraints with corresponding bid bθh with




+ θ1 + f
θk,∗
θ2











+ θ1 + f
θk































and θ1−θ2 < 0. Hence, we have found a vector of probabilities which fulfills all probability and




the constraint that all probabilities have to be non-negative is also fulfilled if θl is sufficiently
small. We conclude that the assumption that the incentive constraint with corresponding bid 0
is not binding in the worst-case belief of type θk, leads to a contradiction.
Case 2: j > 1. If the non-binding incentive constraint is an incentive constraint with corre-
sponding bid bθj with j > 1, we proceed similarly, by constructing a vector which is an element
of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1











then it must hold that l′ ≤ k − 1 because otherwise bidding bθk−1 would never be a best reply.








− θ1 , fθ
k,∗
θ2
, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θj
+ θj , f
θk,∗
θj+1
, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θl





, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θk
+ θk , f
θk,∗
θk+1




where θ1 , θj , θl′ , θk are strictly positive real numbers such that it holds






Since it follows from (??) that −θ1 +θj −θl < 0, it follows directly that the constructed vector
leads to a lower value of the objective function than fθk,∗. In addition, we choose θl′ sufficiently

























+ · · ·+ fθk,∗









+ · · ·+ fθk,∗
θj





Again, we will first show that such θ1 , θj , θj , θk exist, then we will show that the proposed




Equations (??) and (??) are solved by any choice of θ1 , θj , θj , θk which fulfills












⇔ −θ1θk + θjθk − θl′θk − θjθj + θl′θl
′

















⇔ θj = θl′ +
θ1θ
k




⇔ θj = θl′ +
θ1θ
k











⇔ θj = θl′ +
θ1θ
k
θk − θj , θk =
−θl′
(
θk − θj)+ θ1θkθj + θl′θl′
θk (θk − θj)
⇔ θj = θl′ +
θ1θ
k




′ − (θk − θj) θj)+ θ1θkθj
θk (θk − θj) ...
This shows that θ1 , θj , θl′ , θk can be chosen as strictly positive real numbers. Moreover,
it holds that the smaller the valuation of θ1 and θl′ , the smaller the valuation of θj and θk .
Therefore, θ1 , θj and θl′ can be both chosen sufficiently small such that the incentive constraint
(??) is fulfilled.
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The probability constraints are fulfilled by construction. Since all incentive constraints with
corresponding bid b with bθh−1 < b < bθh for h < k − 1 are not binding under fθk,∗, they
will be fulfilled under fθk if θ1 , θj , θl′ , θk are sufficiently small. Any incentive constraint with







+ · · ·+ fθk,∗













































and 0 > −θ1 + θj − θl′ > −θ1 . The incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθj is fulfilled
by construction. Since fθ
k,∗
θh
= 0 for j < h < l′, it holds that all incentive constraints with
corresponding bid bθh with j < h < l′ are fulfilled if θl′ is sufficiently small.






+ · · ·+ fθk,∗












+ . . .+ fθ
k,∗
θh






























and −θ1 + θj − θl′ < 0. Hence, we have found a vector of probabilities, fθ
k
 , which fulfills all
probability and all incentive constraints while inducing a lower value of the objective function.
We can assume that fθkθ1 > 0 because otherwise, the incentive constraint corresponding to bid
0 = bθ1 is not binding and the first case applies. Since fθ
k
θl′ > 0, the constraint that probabilities
are non-negative is also fulfilled if θl′ is sufficiently small. We conclude that the assumption
that an incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 2 is not binding, leads
to a contradiction.

Appendix F. Proof of Lemma ??
Proof. We have to show that for every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θk+1 ≤ θl and
every b with bθl−1 < b ≤ bθl the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb
θl
is empty.
Assume that the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb for some b ∈ (bθl−1 , bθl ] with l > k


























for some appropriate be real numbers δθ1 , . . . , δθm . We will prove the claim in four steps:
(1) For every j with k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m it holds δθj ≥ 0.
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(2) There exist strictly positive real numbers α and β such that
k∑
j=1
































then it holds that δˆθj ≤ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.










solution of minimization problem M θkb , leads to a contradiction.
Proof of step (1)
As shown in the proof of part (i) of Proposition ??, it holds that fθ
k,∗
θj
= 0 for all j > k. Since
probabilities cannot be negative, it follows that δθj ≥ 0 for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Proof of step (2)
Since k < l and fθ
k,∗
θj































is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb ,




θ1 + δθ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk
























It follows that either
∑k
j=1 δθj < 0 or
∑l
j=k+1 δθj > 0. Due to the first probability constraint,
it holds
∑m
j=1 δθj = 0. Assume that
∑k
j=1 δθj ≥ 0. Then it must hold
∑l
j=k+1 δθj > 0. Since
due to step (1) it holds that δθj ≥ 0 for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m, it follows that
∑m
j=1 δθj > 0 which
leads to a contradiction. Hence, it must hold that
∑k
j=1 δθj < 0. Therefore, there exist strictly
positive be real numbers α and β such that
∑k
j=1 δθj = −α and
∑m
j=k+1 δθj = β.
Proof of step (3)
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We start the proof of step (3) by showing the following claim: Let
(


































in minimization problemM θkb all constraints






+ δˆθ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk






















for all t ≤ k − 1.
In order to show this claim, consider all real numbers δ˜θ1 , . . . , δ˜θm such that
∑k










is an element of feasible set of minimization problem M θkb . If
we would consider only the constraint
∑k
j=1 δ˜θj = −α, then one could achieve arbitrarily small
values of the term
∑k
j=1 δ˜θjθ
j by choosing high values of δθ1 , . . . , δk−1 which results in a low









is an element of feasible
set of minimization problem M θkb , the value of the term
∑k
j=1 δ˜θjθ
j is minimized if the values
of all δ˜θj with 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 are as high as possible and the value of δθk is as low as possible
without violating any incentive constraint.
An incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθt−1 < b′ < bθt with t < k cannot be binding









would be an element of the feasible set of
minimization problem M θkb′ which would be a contradiction to Lemma ??. It follows that if all
constraints with corresponding bid bθt with t < k are binding, δ˜θ1 , . . . , δ˜θk−1 cannot be increased
without violating an incentive constraint in minimization problem M θkb . A decrease of δ˜θt with




We conclude that the values of all δθj with 1 ≤ j ≤ k−1 are as high as possible if all constraints




+ δˆθ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk






















for t ≤ k − 1.
We will use this claim in order to show inductively that all δˆθ1 , . . . , δˆθk−1 are non-positive.























Since δˆθl ≥ 0, it holds that
δˆθ1 + . . .+ δˆθlGθl (b) ≤ 0.
Moreover, it follows from fθ
k,∗
θj


















































from which it follows that
δˆθ1 ≤
(







We now turn our attention to the inductive step. Assume it is already shown that δˆt ≤ 0 for all








































from which follows that
δˆθt+1 =
(
δˆθ1 + · · ·+ δˆθt
)(






We conclude that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 it holds δˆθj ≤ 0.
Proof of step (4)


















According to step (3) it holds
∑k
j=1 δˆθjθ
j ≥∑kj=1 δˆθjθk = −αθk. Hence, the maximal possible
valuation for the term −∑kj=1 δθjθj equals to αθk. Since due to step (1), δθj ≥ 0 for all
k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m, it follows that ∑mj=k+1 δθjθj ≥ ∑mj=k+1 δθjθk+1 = βθk+1. Hence, the maximal
possible valuation for the term −∑mj=k+1 δθjθj equals to −βθk+1. It follows from the probability
constraints that




























j ≤ −α+ αθk + β − βθk+1.
Since α = β it holds
−α+ αθk + β − βθk+1 < 0.
Hence, the assumption that the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb is not empty, leads to
a contradiction. 
Appendix G. Proof of Lemma ??
Let θl and θk be a pair of valuations such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−2 and let p∗ be the minimum p
in the construction in Lemma ??. Such a minimum p exists since the worst-case belief of the
θk-type is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl





only the incentive constraints with corresponding bid bθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 are binding if
plugging in the worst-case belief. That is, the construction in Lemma ?? stops at the latest after











denote the solution of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
as constructed in Lemma ??, i.e. if p∗ ≥ l
for all j > p∗ + 1 (and for all j > p∗ + 2 if p∗ < l) it holds that f˜θ
k,b
θl



























n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}.






















= 0 for all j > p∗ + 1 if p∗ ≥ l and for all j > p∗ + 2 if p∗ < l.
(2) It holds for fθ
k,b
θl that all constraints in M θk
b
θl
with corresponding bid bθj with j ≤ p∗
have to be binding.






















Proof of step (1)
If p∗ > k, then the equation which is the binding incentive constraint corresponding to bid
bθl is obviously redundant and therefore, the system of equations in Lemma ?? consist of two
probability constraints and p∗ − 1 binding incentive constraints. This gives a system of p∗ + 1
equations for p∗+ 1 variables. We will provide the proof for the case p∗ ≥ l since the case p∗ < l
works analogously and we will show in Lemma ?? that it indeed holds that p∗ ≥ l.
Assume that there exists at least one h with p∗ + 1 < h ≤ m such that f bθl
θh
> 0. Let






















It holds that f˜θ
k,b
θl
j = 0 for all j with j > p
∗ + 1. Therefore, it holds that δθj ≥ 0 for all
p∗ + 1 < j ≤ m and there exists at least one j with p∗ + 1 < j ≤ m such that δθj > 0.
Before we proceed with the proof, we introduce the concept of δ-sequences. We define a δ-




, . . . , δθlmax , δθkmin , . . . , δθkmax
)
with δkmin = δlmax+1 such that for all
j with lmin ≤ j ≤ lmax it holds δθj < 0 and for all kmin ≤ j ≤ kmax it holds δθj ≥ 0. If at least
76



























, . . . , δθj,lmax , δθj,kmin , . . . , δθj,kmax
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can again be decomposed into δ-sequences. Let m′′ be the number of


































If there does not exist a t with 1 ≤ t ≤ m such that ∑tj=1 δθj > 0, the process of decomposing







δfinal1 < 0 and δ
final
2 > 0. Since
∑m












We illustrate the concept of δ-sequences with the following example.
Example 1. Let



















The vector has two relevant properties. It holds that
∑m
j=1 δθj = 0 and there does not exist a t
with 1 ≤ t ≤ m such that ∑tj=1 δθj = 0. This vector can be decomposed into two δ-sequences
given by










































We define δ′1 =
∑3




















The new vector (δ′1, δ′2) =















































of minimization problem M θk
b
θl





















We can decompose the vector (δθ1 , . . . , δθm) into δ-sequences. Due to the two probability con-















with δfinal1 > 0 and δ
final
2 < 0. Then there exists some 1 ≤ t ≤ m such that
∑t
j=1 δθj > 0.
First, we consider the case that t > p∗. It holds that f˜θ
k,b
θl
j = 0 for all j > p
∗ + 1. Thus, it
holds that δθj ≥ 0 for all j > p∗+1 from which follows that
∑m
j=t+1 δθj ≥ 0. Since
∑t
j=1 δθj > 0,
it holds that
∑m
j=1 δθj > 0 which leads to a contradiction to the first probability constraint.































, is an element of the
feasible set of minimization problem M θk
bl























































































from which follows that
(δθ1 + . . .+ δθl)
n−1
√
θk − bθl ≥ (δθ1 + . . .+ δθt) n−1
√
θk − bθt
⇔ (δθ1 + . . .+ δθl) ≥






which leads to a contradiction to (??). Therefore, the existence of δfinal1 > 0 and δ
final
1 < 0


















Since this is a contradiction to the second probability constraint, it follows that the assumption




> 0 leads to contradiction.
Proof of step (2)






















The worst-case belief of type θk is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem
Mb
θk−1




































Hence, the worst-case belief equilibrium of type θk is an element of the feasible set of minimiza-
tion problem M θk
b
θl
. Assume that the construction in Lemma ?? has reached the step where the
constraint with corresponding bid bθk−1 was added, i.e. all constraints with corresponding bid
bθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 were added and are binding. Consider the solution vector in this step i.e.
the solution of the system of linear equations consisting of the two probability constraints and
the binding incentive constraints with corresponding bid bθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. According to
Lemma ??, this solution vector coincides with the worst-case belief equilibrium of type θk. As




the construction in Lemma ?? would stop. We conclude that it holds p∗ ≤ k − 1.




= 0 for all j > k. Assume that there exists an incentive
constraint with corresponding bid bθh with 1 ≤ h ≤ p∗ which is not binding. Let (δθ1 , . . . , δθm)




















Then there exists j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that δj 6= 0.
We consider the following two cases:































































, this vector is an element of the feasible set of
minimization problem M θk
b
θl
, these two cases constitute all possible cases.
Case 1:
As before, we decompose the vector (δθ1 , . . . , δθm) into δ-sequences. If we can show that there











with δfinal1 < 0 and
δfinal2 > 0. Assume there exists a t with 1 ≤ t ≤ m such that
∑t
j=1 δθj > 0. Since p
∗ ≤ k − 1,




= 0 for all j > k. Because fθ
k,∗
θj
= 0 for all j > k, it follows
that δθj = 0 for all j > k. Due to the first probability constraint, it holds that
∑m
j=1 δθj = 0
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and therefore it must hold that
∑k








































































j=1 δθj ≤ 0 which is a contradiction to (??). Thus, the process of decomposing






with δfinalθm < 0 and δ
final
2 > 0.

































violates the second probability constraint.
Case 2:
As in the first case, if follows from the first probability constraint that
∑k








is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
, it must hold





















. Therefore, it must hold
∑l


















































j=1 δθj = 0 which leads to a contradiction.
We conclude that in both cases the assumption that there exists a h with 1 ≤ h ≤ p∗ such





, leads to a contradiction.
Proof of step (3):
According to the first step, it holds that fθ
k,b
θl
j > 0 only for 1 ≤ j ≤ p∗ + 1 are greater than
















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}.








(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl) n−1
√




 n−1√θk − bθh for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}.
We will show that this system of linear equations has a unique solution. In order to do so, we
will show that the matrix corresponding to the system of equations has rank p∗+ 1 by applying
the Gauss elimination method and obtaining a row echelon form. The incentive constraints can
be also summarized as










θk − bθh+1 = 0
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗ − 1}. In order to obtain an upper triangular matrix, we will successively





















which eliminates the variable fθp∗+1 . Moreover, the coefficient
(
θp
∗+1 − θj) is strictly positive.
Now we subsequently use the transformed incentive constraints given by










θk − bθh+1 = 0
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗ − 1} in order to eliminate the variables fθp∗ , fθp∗−1 , . . . fθ2 . We show by
induction that in every elimination step all coefficients are strictly positive. In particular, this
implies that none of the coefficients is equal to zero and hence, we obtain an upper triangular
matrix after applying the Gauss elimination method. We start the induction by showing that
in the equation which is obtained after eliminating fθp∗ all coefficients are strictly positive. The
variable fθp∗ is eliminated by multiplying the incentive constraint given by































θp∗+1 − θj +
(
θp




 = θp∗+1 − µ
where all coefficients are strictly positive. Now we turn our attention to the induction step





all coefficients c and cj for 1 ≤ j ≤ h are strictly positive. Now we have to eliminate the variable
fθh using the incentive constraint










θk − bθh = 0.
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n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}
can be rearranged to a system of linear equations such that the resulting matrix has rank p∗+ 1












fulfills the same p∗+1 equations and the solution of the






















Appendix H. Proof of Lemma ??
We have to show that for every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−2 the
minimum p for minimization problem M θk
b
θl
is greater or equal then l + 1. We will prove the
















as constructed in Lemma ??. Assume that the minimum p is strictly smaller than l + 1.
Under this assumption, we will show the following steps:
(1) The minimum p is equal to l − 1.





















Then for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l it holds δθj > 0, for all l+ 2 ≤ j ≤ k it holds that δθj < 0 and for
all k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m it holds that δθj=0.












of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
leads to a contradiction to the assumption p∗ < l + 1
Proof of step (1):
If the minimum p, denoted by p∗, is strictly smaller than l + 1, then the last equation added
in the construction of Lemma ?? has a corresponding bid which is lower or equal than bθl−1





















is fulfilled trivially. Therefore, it holds p∗ < l. It cannot hold that p∗ < l − 1 because then
according to Lemma ?? there would be no probability weight on types above θl. This would










is maximized. This cannot be optimal because the worst-case belief of the θk-type is an element
of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
and has a lower value of the objective function.
We conclude that p∗ = l − 1.
Proof of step (2):
























there is no probability weight on types above θl+1. In the worst-case belief of the
θk-type there is probability weight on types θj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and there is no probability weight
on types θj for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Therefore, for all j with l + 2 ≤ j ≤ k it holds that δθj < 0 and
for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m it holds that δθj = 0. Note that the set {j | l + 2 ≤ j ≤ k} is not empty
because l ≤ k − 2. Since ∑mj=1 δθj has to be zero, it follows that ∑l+1j=1 δθj > 0.















, all constraints with corresponding bid below bθl have to binding. We use this in
order to show by induction that δθ1 , . . . , δθl have to be strictly positive.
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Subtracting (??) from (??) gives
δθ1 + · · ·+ δθl ≥








We start the inductive proof by showing that δθ1 is strictly positive. According to Lemma ??,
















































































































Assume that we have shown that δθj > 0 for all 1 ≤ j < h for some 1 < h < l. Then we can










































from which follows that
(δθ1 + · · ·+ δθh) n−1
√
















We conclude that for all j with 1 ≤ j ≤ l it holds δθj > 0.
Proof of step (3):
Let α and β be strictly positive be real numbers such that
∑l+1
j=1 δθj = α and
∑k
j=l+2 δθj = −β.
Due to the two probability constraints it must hold that

















−βθl+2. It follows from step (2) that ∑l+1j=1 δθjθj < ∑l+1j=1 δθjθl+1 = αθl+1. According to (??),








j < αθl+1 − βθl+2 = βθl+1 − βθl+2 < 0
which is a contradiction to (??). Hence, we have found a contradiction to the assumption that
the minimum p is strictly smaller than l + 1.
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Appendix I. Proof of Lemma ??









denote a solution of minimization problem M θkb .


















Assume that fθk,b 6= fθk,∗. Then there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that δj 6= 0. Therefore, one can
decompose the vector (δθ1 , . . . , δθm) into δ-sequences and if there does not exist a 1 ≤ t ≤ m
with
∑t
j=1 δθj > 0, the process of decomposing into δ-sequences end with a δ-sequence of length






with δfinal1 < 0 and δ
final
2 > 0.
Assume there exists a 1 ≤ t ≤ m with∑tj=1 δθj > 0. We consider two cases: t ≤ k and t > k.
Case 1: t ≤ k.

















































Thus, we consider two subcases.






+ · · ·+ fθk,∗
θk
)n−1





+ · · ·+ fθk,∗θt
)n−1
(θk − bθt).















+ · · ·+ fθk,bθt
)n−1
(θk − bθt)














+ · · ·+ fθk,bθt
)n−1
(θk − bθt).
Subtracting equation (??) gives k∑
j=1
δθj




 n−1√θk − bθt .
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Thus, it holds that
∑k
j=1 δθj > 0. Due to the first probability constraint, it follows that∑m
j=k+1 δθj < 0. Since f
θk,∗
θj




≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.






+ · · ·+ fθk,∗
θk−1
)n−1





+ · · ·+ fθk,∗θt
)n−1
(θk − bθt).















+ · · ·+ fθk,bθt
)n−1
(θk − bθt).














+ · · ·+ fθk,bθt
)n−1
(θk − bθt).
Subtracting equation (??) givesk−1∑
j=1
δθj




 n−1√θk − bθt .
Thus, it holds that
∑k−1
j=1 δθj > 0. Since f
θk,∗
θj




≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
that δθj ≥ 0 for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Since
∑m
j=1 δθj = 0, it follows that δk < 0 which is a
contradiction to (??).
Case 2: t > k.
Due to the first probability constraint, it follows from
∑t
j=1 δθj > 0 that
∑m




= 0 for all j > k, this leads to a contradiction to the constraint fθ
k,b
θj
≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.







with δfinal1 < 0 and δ
final
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